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THE TAMING OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
JOHN S. APPLEGATE*
At its core, the precautionary principle embodies two fundamental
regulatory policies: anthropogenic harm to human health and the environment
should be avoided or minimized through anticipatory, preventive regulatory
controls; and, to accomplish this, activities and technologies whose
environmental consequences are uncertain but potentially serious should be
restricted until the uncertainty is largely resolved. It reflects the implicit
judgment that, in the absence of some degree of ex ante regulatory review,
new technologies will create novel, severe, and irreversible-but
avoidable-harms to human health and the environment. It also reflects the
value judgment that protection of human and environmental health trumps
quantitative measures of risk and economic efficiency. The precautionary
principle has become a fixture of formal expressions of international
environmental law and policy. Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration of
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
("UNCED") provides,
[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.'
This text is the most authoritative formulation of the principle, by virtue of
its widespread acceptance and the absence of credible challengers. Several
more recent treaties have incorporated the Rio formulation by reference.2
* Associate Dean and Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law
- Bloomington. I am grateful to the editors of the William and MaryEnvironmental Law and
Policy Review for the invitation to participate in this symposium, and to the symposium
participants for many helpful thoughts and suggestions.
' Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Annex 1, princ. 15, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
2 See, e.g., Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Res.
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Many other conventions and tribunals, even in a hostile forum like the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"), have accepted the precautionary principle in
some form,3 to the extent that two commentators who have studied the
question exhaustively regard the precautionary principle as a customary rule
of international law.4
At some level of generality, precaution is undoubtedly a customary
rule of international law.' At the level of specific words and provisions,
however, there remains significant diversity in the meaning of the
precautionary principle, and this diversity is both the product and target of
considerable political maneuvering. There also remain some very important
and powerful skeptics of the precautionary principle, principally the United
2, Annex, 22, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199.20, U.N. Sales No. E.03.II.A.1 (2002),
http://www.johannesburg.org/html/documents/sunmitdocs/l 31302_wssd.report reissue
d.pdf [hereinafter Plan of Implementation]; Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants, U.N. Env't Prog., art. 1, U.N. Doc. UNEP/POPS/CONF/2 (2001), 40 I.L.M. 532
[hereinafter POPS Convention]; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, art. 1, 39 I.L.M. 1027 [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol];
Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Persistent
Organic Pollutants, opened for signature June 24, 1998, pmbl., http://www.unece.org/env/
lrtap/pops hl.htm (last updated Dec. 5, 2002); and other conventions listed in ARIE
TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 320-27(2002).
' A recent comprehensive list is in TROUWBORST, supra note 2, at 303-47 (listing current
to Sept. 1, 2001). See also HARALD HOHMANN, PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DUTIES AND
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1994) (surveying
international and domestic law).
4 HOHMANN, supra note 3, at 335-45; TROUWBORST, supra note 2, at 244-45, 285. Other
commentators are divided. See James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Status of the
Precautionary Principle in International Law, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND
INTERNATIONALLAW: THECHALLENGEOFIMPLEMENTATION 36-50 (David Freestone & Ellen
Hey, eds., 1996) [hereinafter THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION]; TROUWBORST, supra
note 2, at 260-84 (reviewing findings of other commentators); Sonia Boutillon proposes that
it be regarded as a "standard" which has a clear legal existence but gains legal force only in
application. Sonia Boutillon, The Precautionary Principle: Development ofan International
Standard, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429, 447, 469 (2002).
' Trouwborst's generalized version is, "in the face of a (whether or not 'significant') threat
of environmental harm, preventive action ought to be taken even where relevant information
on that threat and its probable effects is not conclusive." TROUWBORST, supra note 2, at 245.
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States, the international trade community represented by the WTO, and
national and transnational economic enterprises.6 Within the United States,
senior government officials and many prominent scholars vigorously oppose
the precautionary principle, because they see it as a replacement for the risk-
based, science-dominated, cost-sensitive regulatory structures that have come
to characterize most of the world's sophisticated environmental regimes.7
These regulatory regimes proceed from the view that economic expansion
and technological innovation are to be encouraged because they increase
overall social welfare, including improved human and environmental health.
In this view, the precautionary principle offers an unwelcome and technically
insupportable alternative. As a result, the precautionary principle, despite its
enshrinement in many international agreements, is under constant pressure
from opponents who accept the generality but vigorously seek to alter the
specifics.
This Article argues that, even as the precautionary principle has found
ever wider acceptance in international environmental policy, strong versions
of the principle have been systematically tamed-reduced, as it were, from
a tiger to a housecat. Part I demonstrates that the constituent elements of the
precautionary principle have been altered over time to be less stringent or to
6 Thus, Trouwborst's talk of the "current wholehearted acceptance of the principle by the
international community," id. at 285 (emphasis added), almost certainly overstates the
enthusiasm with which the precautionary principle is regarded. David Vanderzwaag identifies
three major environmental threats that have seen, in actual practice, "cautious approaches to
precaution": climate change, hazardous chemicals, and overfishing. David Vanderzwaag, The
Precautionary Principle and Marine Environmental Protection: Slippery Shores, Rough
Seas, and Rising Normative Tides, 33 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 165, 170-73 (2002)
[hereinafter Vanderzwaag, Slippery Shores].
' See e.g., Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 851 (1996); Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,790 (2001); John D. Graham, The Role of Precaution in
Risk Assessment and Management: An American's View, Address Before the The European
Commission, the US Mission to the EU, the German Marshall Fund with the European Policy
Centre and the Center for Environmental Solutions (Jan. 11-12, 2002),
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/ eu-speech.html ("As you know, the US government
supports precautionary approaches to risk management but we do not recognize any universal
precautionary principle. We consider it to be a mythical concept, perhaps like a unicorn.").
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narrow the scope of the principle. In other words, those aspects of the
principle that remain uncertain--"slippery" in Professor Vanderzwaag's
words 8-have been systematically pushed in the direction of a weaker
principle. Part II reinforces this point by examining as a whole four key
statements of the principle. At this level also, the precautionary principle
shows a consistent pattern of being tamed. Specifically, the precautionary
principle no longer reflects a hazard paradigm of environmental regulation;
it now represents a very different risk paradigm.
At this summer's World Summit on Sustainable Development
("WSSD") in Johannesburg, the international community had an opportunity
to evaluate this trend and to explore what, if anything, the precautionary
principle adds to environmental policy and the role that it should play in
sustainable development, the overarching environmental paradigm that was
the focus of the Johannesburg discussions. The Johannesburg Summit,
however, addressed other aspects of sustainable development, implicitly
acquiescing in a compromised precautionary principle. Part ITn concludes the
Article with a brief discussion of the roles that a revitalized precautionary
principle might play in environmental law and policy.
I. THE CHANGING ELEMENTS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
One of the principal criticisms of the precautionary principle is its
indefiniteness. There are many versions of it and none gives explicit direction
for individual cases.' While the Rio version quoted above is as convenient
' Vanderzwaag, Slippery Shores, supra note 6, at 166-70. See also David Vanderzwaag, The
Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and Policy: Elusive Rhetoric and First
Embraces, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 355, 358 (1999) (suggesting a "spectrum of embraces"
from passionate to cool) [hereinafter Vanderzwaag, First Embraces]. Both Trouwborst and
Hohmann recognize the existence of significant variation. See HOHMANN, supra note 3, at
335-40 (describing "relativity" regarding form of the source of law, time, and region);
Trouwborst, supra note 2, at 286; HOHMANN, supra note 3, at 335-40 (describing "relativity"
regarding form of the source of law, time, and region).
9 Even generally sympathetic commentators have noted this problem. Mark Geistfeld,




and authoritative a single text as there is, most international instruments
develop their own unique language as the result of negotiation over the
particular issue at hand. Arie Trouwborst's comprehensive study of the
evolution and status of the precautionary principle in international law found
references in fifty-three legally binding instruments and forty-five non-
binding instruments, in addition to individual states', commentators', and
nongovernmental organizations' statements of the principle. ° Some recent
treaties have either explicitly referenced or incorporated the Rio formulation,
but it is too early to see a trend toward adoption of a single version. The
precautionary principle is, and is likely to remain for some time, embodied
in several different verbal expressions.
A. Elements of the Precautionary Principle
Notwithstanding a certain amount of American hand-wringing about
the many versions of the precautionary principle," it is perfectly possible to
make sense out of the numerous formulations of the precautionary principle
by breaking it down into elements and charting the variation within those
elements. I count four:' 2
Many of these are collected in HOHMANN, supra note 3.
" This state of affairs is apparently very disconcerting for American critics of the
precautionary principle, surprisingly so because this is exactly how the common law has
developed in the fifty states. To take a familiar example, adverse possession has fifty
different expressions in as many state courts, and yet property teachers have never had much
difficulty distilling a number of key elements (entry and exclusive possession; open and
notorious occupation; hostile occupation; and continuous, uninterrupted possession over the
entire limitations period), which individual states either use or not and each of which they
interpret in different ways. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 853-60 (3d ed. 2000). The Rule Against Perpetuities was presumably similarly
diffuse until John Chipman Grey developed a generalized statement of the elements of the
rule ("[n]o interest is good..."), which has over time come to dominate the field, id. at 118-
25-just as the Rio formulation may one day.
12 John S. Applegate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the Precautionary Principle to
Harmonize the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 207,249-55 (2001) [hereinafter Applegate, Prometheus Principle]; JohnS. Applegate,
The Precautionary Preference: An American Perspective on the Precautionary Principle,
2002]
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* The trigger is the initial degree and certainty of future harm (i.e., the
danger) that justifies a regulatory response. It incorporates two sub-
elements: the seriousness of the anticipated harm, and the quantity
and quality of the information on the basis of which harm is foreseen.
Both of these, obviously, are susceptible of significant variation.
- The timing is the relationship between the initial understanding of
the hazard (the trigger) and the taking of regulatory action. The
temporal relationship tells regulators how to manage uncertainty, the
defining characteristic of many environmental problems. It is
designed to permit or require regulatory action before uncertainties
are resolved, and it is the core purpose of the precautionary
principle. 3 It goes beyond prevention of known risks (e.g., requiring
6 HuM. & ECOL. RISK ASSESSMENT 413, 415-20 (2000) [hereinafter Applegate,
Precautionary Preference]. Sandin identifies four "dimensions"-threat, uncertainty,
action, and command- and he measures each dimension along a spectrum of precision and
strength. Per Sandin, Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle, 5 HUM. & ECOL. RISK
ASSESSMENT 889, 890-95 (1999). Vanderzwaag identifies seven areas in which the
precautionary principle is "slippery," many of which overlap the elements proposed here.
Vanderzwaag, Slippery Shores, supra note 6, at 166-70. Other efforts to identify and
characterize elements of the precautionary principle include Boutillon supra note 4, at 447-
51; Andrew Jordan & Timothy O'Riordan, The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary
Environmental Policy and Politics, in PROTECTINGPUBLICHEALTHAND THEENVIRONMENT:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 23-29(Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel A.
Tickner, eds., 1999) [hereinafter PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH]; Tim O'Riordan & James
Cameron, Introduction to INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, 17-18 (Tim
O'Riordan & James Cameron, eds.,1994) [hereinafter INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE]; HOHMANN, supra note 3, at 189-203; Deborah Katz, The Mismatch Between the
Biosafety Protocol and the Precautionary Principle, 13 GEo. INT'LENVTL. L. REv. 949,956-
57 (2001). See also Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle in Canada: The First
Decade, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,407, 11,108 (2002) (describing the issues that
arise in implementing the precautionary principle).
" David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle,
in THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 4, at 12-13 [hereinafter Freestone &
Hey, Origins and Development]. United Nations Secretary Annan's initiative for corporate
responsibility, The Global Compact, includes "a precautionary approach to environmental
challenges" and characterizes "prevention rather than cure" as the "key element of a
[Vol. 27:13
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
construction workers to wear hard hats) to anticipate as yet uncertain
ones (e.g., endocrine disruption or the precise effects of climate
change) where the causal relationship has yet to be firmly
established.' 4
* Once the harm and uncertainty thresholds are met, the precautionary
principle addresses the regulatory response.5 The precautionary
principle is frequently caricatured as requiring the regulator to ban or
forgo an activity or technology altogether,'6 and sometimes it has
been used to justify such action (for example, bans on genetically
modified organisms ("GMO"s)). However, none of the texts speaks
in such absolute terms. The precautionary principle embraces a range
precautionary approach." http://65.214.34.30/un/gc/unweb.nsf/content/print.htn.
14 NICHOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO
LEGAL RULES 91 (2002) (characterizing precaution as "a genuine paradigm stuff');
TROUWBORST, supra note 3, at 36-43 (distinguishing prevention and precaution). Professor
Geistfeld reconceptualizes the relationship between uncertainty and regulatory action as less
about timing than about the distribution of the error costs between actor and potential victim:
Cases of scientific uncertainty therefore pose a particular type of
distributive problem. In such cases, regulatory errors are inevitable, and
someone must bear the associated costs. A regulatory approach based on
the precautionary principle places the cost on those who directly benefit
from the potentially hazardous activity, while seeking to minimize the
impacts of uncertainty on these parties who might be physically injured.
Geistfeld, supra note 9, at 11,331. Cf Carl F. Cranor, Asymmetric Information, the
Precautionary Principle, and Burdens ofProof, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note
12, at 77-82 (discussing the problem in terms of asymmetric information). From this
perspective, the command of the precautionary principle is not to abjure the technocratic
tools of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis, but to apply those tools using the values
that potential victims-as opposed to actors-would reasonably choose. Geistfeld, supra
note 9, at 11,333. This allocates the costs of uncertainty across classes of persons, just as the
temporal conception allocates it across time.
'5 Sandin emphasizes the "if... then" nature of the elements. Sandin, supra note 12, at 891.
16 See e.g., Ronald Bailey, Precautionary Tale, REASON, Apr. 1999, at 37; see also
Applegate, Prometheus Principle, supra note 12, at 252 (describing caricatures).
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of regulatory responses, taking into account a variety of factors
(severity, cost, risk trade-offs) and a flexible degree ofrisk aversion.1 7
- Finally, because the precautionary principle justifies regulatory
action on the basis of present uncertainty, the precautionary principle
anticipates iteration. Action taken on the basis of uncertainty is
necessarily tentative, and the principle thus implies that some action
will be taken by someone to reduce the uncertainty to levels
appropriate for taking final regulatory action. Different versions of the
precautionary principle take different positions on whether returning
to the question is mandatory or not and where lies the burden of
proof, that is, who is to produce the new information, when it is to be
produced, and how persuasive it must be.
In the Rio formulation, the trigger is represented by the phrase "threats of
serious or irreversible damage." Timing is described as "lack offull scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing . . . measures to
prevent." The expected response is "cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation." Iteration is implied in the idea of"full scientific
certainty," because there will never be full scientific certainty, but certainty
can be progressively approached. The Rio formulation is silent on burden of
proof.
Since each version of the precautionary principle contains all or most
of these elements, division into elements can be used to make sense of the
many verbal formulations of the principle. The elements can also be used to
track variation and change in the precautionary principle. By comparing
different verbal formulations of the same element, we can see how the
7 See David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Challenges
and Opportunities, in THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 4, at 250-53
[hereinafter Freestone & Hey, Implementation]; Les Levidow et al., Genetically Modified
Crops in the European Union: Regulatory Conflicts as Precautionary Opportunities, 3(3)
J. RISK REs. 189 (2000); Andr6 Noellkaemper, "What You Risk Reveals What You Value,"
and Other Dilemmas Encountered in the Legal Assaults on Risks, in THE CHALLENGE OF
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 4, at 77-79.
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precautionary principle has evolved. While there is some artificiality to this
piecemeal approach" (remedied, it is hoped, in Part 11), it is also the case that
each different version of the precautionary principle was negotiated word by
word and element by element. Thus, each element will show the conflicts and
pressures that influence the principle as a whole.
B. Changing Elements
It is indisputable that considerable variety exists among the verbal
formulations of the precautionary principle, and commentators have
suggested a number of factors to explain the variation and, in particular, the
variation in strictness. Arguably stronger versions are associated with
instruments that are merely hortatory,19 that reflect regional agreements
among relatively homogenous states,2" or that address particularly disfavored
activities.2 There is truth in each of these observations. With respect to the
binding nature of the instrument, for example, the Vienna Convention on the
Protection of the Ozone Layer contains a strong precautionary command, but
it is only stated in the preamble, and the overall treaty is merely a framework
to be followed by mandatory reductions.22 The Rio Declaration contains a
fairly moderate version, but it is a statement of goals; Agenda 21, Rio's
blueprint for action, is nearly silent on the precautionary principle. 23
J See Sandin, supra note 12, at 896-98.
'9 Katz, supra note 12, at 965; Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multi-Risk World, in
HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509, 1521-24 (Dennis D.
Paustenbach ed., 2002).
20 HOHMANN, supra note 3, at 339-40.
21 Katz, supra note 12, at 958-61 (discussing hazardous waste).
22 Vienna Convention for the Protection ofthe Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, pmbl., S. TREATYDOC.
No. 99-9 (1985), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516, 1529.
23 Agenda 21, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, 17.21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 151/PC/100/Add. 1 (1992), http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/agenda21text.htm,
[hereinafter Agenda 21] (advocating a "precautionary and anticipatory rather than a reactive
approach... to prevent the degradation of the marine environment"). See also 22.5(c)
(mentioning precaution).
2002]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
Turning to geographic reach, the very strong North Sea,24 Nordic
Council,25 and Bergen 26 Declarations' statements of the precautionary
principle all reflect agreement primarily among northern European nations.
The agreements are advisory and address a broadly recognized problem,
marine pollution. Likewise, the strong Bamako Convention on the
Importation of Hazardous Waste into Africa 27 was a regional reaction to the
weaker but globally applicable Basel Convention on the transportation of
hazardous waste (which does not even mention the precautionary principle).28
The Rio Declaration, a global consensus document, is less strong than these
regional agreements. Indeed, it almost goes without saying (it is practically
a tautology) that the identity of the parties drafting the precautionary principle
in a given instrument will have a great deal to do with the way that it is
expressed. African states have a different perspective than the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")29 or the WTO.30 The
European Commission has a different perspective from its individual member
governments, as the Commission is primarily concerned with economic
24 Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea,
Nov. 25, 1987, M VII, XVI, 27 I.L.M. 835, 838, 840-845 (1998) [hereinafter North Sea
Declaration].
'5 Declaration ofthe Nordic Council's International Conference on Pollution of the Seas, Oct.
18, 1989, reprinted in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 268
[hereinafter Nordic Council Declaration].
26 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, [1990]
1 Y.B. Int'l Envtl. L. 429, 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/l0 [hereinafter Bergen
Declaration].
27 Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movement and Management ofHazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, art. 4, 3(f)-
(h), 30 I.L.M. 773, 781-82 (1991) [hereinafter Bamako Convention].
2 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, U.N. Doc. EP/IG.80/3 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657 [hereinafter Basel
Convention].29 OECD Council Recommendation on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, Jan. 31,
1991, C(90)164 (final), excerpted in TROUWBORST, supra note 2, at 334.
30 This is reflected in case law and in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/
spse.htm [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
[Vol. 27:13
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integration and is only indirectly affected by the strong green presence in
many European electorates.3'
Examining subject matter, the strong version of precaution that can
be found in the Bamako Convention and the Cartagena Protocol on GMOs
32
both regulate activities that have raised particular concern in the international
community. Agreements designed to encourage trade, by contrast, adopt a
considerably weaker version of the principle.33 Deborah Katz demonstrated
that treaties dealing with hazardous waste consistently score in the stronger
range among the elements of the precautionary principle.34
This Article suggests that there is, in addition, chronological variation
among versions of the precautionary principle, reflecting continuing pressure
to adopt a less stringent principle. Earlier versions of the precautionary
principle contain elements that tend to increase its stringency, while later
versions tend to be less strict." Not surprisingly, this pattern is not perfectly
realized in practice. The period during which the change occurs is quite
limited. A survey of the most important instruments suggests that, while it
clearly had antecedents, the precautionary principle began to be a standard
part of environmental treaties only in the late 1980s.36 The 1992 Rio
Declaration (and the other Earth Summit treaties, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on
3" See generally Boutillon, supra note 4, at 465-67 (discussing the formalization of the
precautionary principle by the European Commission).32 Bamako Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(3)(f)-(h); Cartagena Protocol, supra note 2, arts.
10(6), 11(8).
"3 E.g., SPS Agreement, supra note 30, art. 2(2).
14 Katz, supra note 12, at 957.
" Here again, Sandin's work is invaluable in defining elements (or "dimensions") of the
precautionary principle and describing the range of stringency of each element. Sandin, supra
note 12, at 890-95. As noted above, his definitions of the elements differ somewhat from the
ones adopted here. Sandin measures both "strength" and "precision." Id. at 895-98.
36 For surveys, see David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Origins and Development, supra note 13,
at 3-15; James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in
International EnvironmentalLaw, 14 VA. ENVTL L.J. 423,432-38 (1995); HOHMANN, supra
note 3; Peter H. Sand, The Precautionary Principle: A European Perspective, 6 HuM. &
ECOL. RISK ASSESSMENT 445, 445-46 (2000); TROUWBORST, supra note 2, annexes A, B;
Vanderzwaag, First Embraces, supra note 8, at 363-72.
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Biological Diversity) represented something of a turning point.37 The
precautionary principle gained greater salience in the international
environmental lexicon in 1992, but, as a result, statements of the
precautionary principle came under increased scrutiny from its critics. Thus,
after Rio-which was itself a carefully compromised text-there is a
discernible trend toward less strict versions of the precautionary principle.
The chronological shift, therefore, occurs over a fairly short time and there
are examples of anticipation and lag among individual elements. The overall
trend, however, is plain enough.
1. Trigger
Early statements of the precautionary principle did little to define the
kinds of anticipated harm that would trigger the precautionary principle. The
Nordic Council International Conference on the Pollution of the Sea (1989)
spoke simply of"damage or harmful effects,"38 and the North Sea Declaration
(1987) of "possibly damaging effects. ' 39 By the time of the Rio Declaration,
the principle is limited to "serious or irreversible damage. '40 The
contemporaneous Helsinki Declaration on Transboundary Watercourses and
the Biodiversity Convention speak, respectively, of "significant adverse
effect[s]"' and of"significant reduction or loss of biological diversity."42 The
much later European Commission Communication on the precautionary
principle requires uncertainty to be affirmatively demonstrated before the
37 TROUWBORST, supra note 3, at 28 (describing a "breakthrough" of the precautionary
principle into international law).
38Nordic Council Declaration, supra note 25.
39 North Sea Declaration, supra note 24, VII.
40 Rio Declaration, supra note 1, princ. 15. See also United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 108,
reprinted in, 31 I.L.M. 849, art. 3(3), also a product of the Earth Summit [hereinafter Climate
Change Convention]; Bergen Declaration, supra note 26.
41 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, art. 2(1), 2(5)(a), 31 I.L.M. 1312 [hereinafter Transboundary Lakes
Convention].




principle may be relied upon, though it sets the seriousness trigger at any
level above the member state's desired level of protection for its citizens.43
The threshold amount of information also changes over time. The
1987 North Sea Declaration speaks of "possibly damaging" activities," the
1991 resolution of the parties to the London Dumping Convention of "reason
to believe" that cause and effect are related,45 and the 1991 Bamako
Convention simply "may cause. '46 Transitional formulations in 1992 include
"reasonable grounds for concern" in the Convention for the Protection of
the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic ("OSPAR"), 47 and a shift
in language at the Earth Summit to "threats" of harm,48 suggesting both
greater severity and likelihood. Other early statements, including the 1987
Montreal Protocol, clearly require that some amount of investigation precede
invocation of the principle. 49 By contrast, the European Commission in 2000
41 Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM(OO) I final at
16-17, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2000/ com_2000-0001 en01 .pdf
(Feb. 2, 2000)[hereinafter Commission Communication]. The member state's ability to set
this level is not unlimited; it must be, among other things, nondiscriminatory and consistent
with other domestic risk levels. Id. at 18.
" North Sea Declaration, supra note 24, VII.
45 Resolution LDC 44(14) on the Application of the Precautionary Approach to
Environmental Protection within the Framework of the London Dumping Convention, Dec.
30, 1991, excerpted in TROUWBORST, supra note 2, at 308 [hereinafter London Dumping
Convention Resolution]. For the London Dumping Convention, see Convention for the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, adopted Dec. 29,
1972,26U.S.T.2403,1046U.N.T.S. 120,http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/marine.pollution.
dumping.of.wastes. 1972.html [hereinafter London Dumping Convention].
46 Bamako Convention, supra note 27, art. 3(f).47 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Sept.
22, 1992, art. 2(2)(a), 32 I.L.M. 1069, 1076 (1993), reprinted in TROUWBORST, supra note
2, at 310-11 [hereinafter OSPAR].
"8 Rio Declaration, supra note 1, princ. 15; Climate Change Convention, supra note 40, art.
3(3). This terminology was anticipated in the Bergen Declaration, supra note 26, and the
Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference, Nov. 7, 1990, princ. 7,
available in 1 Y.B. Int'l Envtl. L. 473 (1990), excerpted in TROUWBORST, supra note 3, at
333.
"' For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, pmbl., 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1550-51 (1987), states unequivocally that the parties are
"[d]etermined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures" and also that
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repeatedly emphasized the need to perform a traditional risk assessment
based on available information--"Before the precautionary principle is
invoked, the scientific data relevant to the risks must first be
evaluated.""°-and the European Union ("EU") Treaty's adoption of the
precautionary principle is qualified by the parallel requirement to rely on
"available scientific and technical data."" Most recently, the Cartagena
Protocol "takes as its starting point a risk assessment.' 2 The repeated use of
the word "scientific" in the latter instruments is not accidental: the parties
want to define both a quantum of preexisting evidence and appropriate
methods of proof. 3 Most commentators are in agreement that current law
requires a demonstrated scientific basis for anticipating harms.'4
2. Timing
If environmental regulation is to prevent harm before it occurs,
regulators will usually need to take action despite incomplete information or
understanding, especially of the scientific issues relating to causation and
"measures taken to protect the ozone layer from depletion should be based on relevant
scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic considerations."
"0 Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 13-14. See also id. at 3 (stating that the
precautionary principle is mainly relevant to risk management, which follows risk
assessment).
51 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 174(2),(3), 298 U.N.T.S.
11, as amended by Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, reprinted in 37
I.L.M. 56.
52 Aarti Gupta, Governing Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms: The Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, 42(4) ENV'T 23, 30 (May 2000) [hereinafter Gupta, Governing
Trade].
" See SPS Agreement, supra note 30; Commission Communication, supra note 43
(discussing scientific factors throughout the document).
14 See, e.g., Nollkaemper, supra note 17, at 73, 83-84; John S. Gray, Integrating
Precautionary Scientific Methods into Decision-Making, in THE CHALLENGE OF
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 4, at 133, 135. Other authors assert that a different kind of
science-that is, "precautionary science," which is not based on traditional, mechanistic
proof of cause and effect and whose results are not necessarily quantitative-is an
appropriate basis for action. See Katherine Barrett & Carolyn Raffensperger, Precautionary
Science, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 12, at 106, 109-12, 117-18.
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risk. The raison d'tre ofthe precautionary principle is its particular temporal
relationship between scientific certainty and regulatory action: action
precedes certainty.15 Most versions of the precautionary principle simply
assume that uncertainty will exist in any circumstance to which the principle
applies. The 2000 European Commission statement, on the other hand, makes
this a specific prerequisite to the application of the precautionary principle.
If examination of the existing science reveals a well characterized risk, the
precautionary principle is no longer "relevant," and a final regulatory decision
should be reached on the basis of the existing information. 6
The nature of the uncertainty is also an issue. Early versions applied
the precautionary principle when there was inadequate proof of a causal link,
that is, in situations in which, potentially, the cure would not affect the
disease at all.57 The emphasis on action in the absence of proof of a causal
link is nearly universal in earlier versions of the principle.58 The 1987 Second
North Sea Declaration adopts precaution in the absence of "absolutely clear
scientific evidence," a state of affairs which is more or less universal in
environmental law, and so provides very little limitation on the scope of the
precautionary principle.59 Later versions, which tend to speak of "full
5 See Geistfeld, supra note 9, at 11,328; Jordan & O'Riordan, supra note 12, at 23-29.
56 Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 13.
"North Sea Declaration, supra note 24, VII; Nordic Council Declaration, supra note 25;
Ministerial Declaration of the Third International Conference on the Protection of the North
Sea, pmbl., Mar. 8, 1990, available in 1 Y.B. Int'l Envtl. L. 658, 662-73 (1990), excerpted
in TROUWBORST, supra note 2, at 332 [hereinafter Hague Declaration]; Paris Convention for
the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, Feb. 21, 1974, arts. 4(4), 11,
13 I.L.M. 352 [hereinafter PARCOM].
5 Precautionary Approach to Marine Pollution, Including Waste-Dumping at Sea, U.N.
Environment Programme, 15th Sess., Decision 15/27, (1990), excerpted in TROUWBORST,
supra note 2, at 331; Nordic Council Declaration, supra note 25; PARCOM, supra 57;
Hague Declaration, supra note 57, pmbl.; London Dumping Convention, supra note 45;
OSPAR, supra note 47, art. 2(2)(a); North Sea Declaration, supra note 24, VII. See also
Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle, Jan. 25, 1998, reprinted in
PROTECTING PuBLIc HEALTH, supra note 12, at 353-54.
" North Sea Declaration, supra note 24, VII. Sandin characterizes this as a very weak form
of the precautionary principle, but I read it differently. Sandin, supra note 12, at 901.
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scientific certainty"'60 seem designed to limit the precautionary principle to the
fairly narrow range between a sufficiently developed trigger (described
above) and the impossible dream of truly complete certainty. The SPS
Agreement of 1993 and Cartagena Protocol of 2000 contemplate inadequate
information" or "lack of . . . certainty due to insufficient scientific
information,"62 suggesting that a practical regulatory meaning of complete
information is contemplated. That is, if adequate information is within
grasp-by doing more risk assessment studies, for example-then the
precautionary principle would not be applicable.
Different formulations of precaution envision different relationships
between the existence or finding of uncertainty and the obligation to take
regulatory action.63 Jonathan Wiener has identified three models.' The
strongest requires restrictions in the face of uncertainty. That is, the overall
burden of proving safety is on the risk creator. This is the defining
characteristic of all licensing schemes (for example, for pesticides and
pharmaceuticals),65 but no actual version of the precautionary principle
expressly requires it.66 The middle-ground position is that uncertainty
justifies regulatory action. This can be seen in the EU Treaty ("preventive
60 E.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 1, princ. 15; Bergen Declaration, supra note 26;
Biodiversity Convention, supra note 42; Climate Change Convention, supra note 40, art.
3(3).
61 SPS Agreement, supra note 33, art. 5(7).
62 Cartagena Protocol, supra note 2, arts. 10(6), 11(8).
63 Sandin calls this the "command dimension" and describes a spectrum from allowable, to
justified, to recommended, to mandatory. Sandin, supra note 12, at 895.
' Wiener, supra note 19, at 1513-16.
65 JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., THE REGULATION OF ToxIc SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS
WASTES 584-93 (2000).
' The North Sea Declaration, supra note 24, comes closest in referring to "a precautionary
approach is necessary which may require action to control." The introduction of "may,"
however, makes it less than mandatory. Several commentators have advocated it, however.
See, e.g., JOE THORNTON, PANDORA'S POISON: CHLORINE, HEALTH, AND NEW
ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 10, 246-49 (2000); David Santillo et al., The Precautionary
Principle in Practice: A Mandate for Anticipatory Preventative Action, in PROTECTING
PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 12, at 47.
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action should be taken")67 and, indirectly, in the Bamako Convention,
which mandates "the precautionary principle to pollution prevention" rather
than "a permissible emissions approach based on assimilative capacity
assumptions."68 The most recent and by now best-established approach is that
uncertainty does not justify inaction. This is the Rio formulation ("shall not
be used as a reason for postponing" regulatory measures), and it also appears
in the 1990 Bergen Declaration.69 Perhaps the clearest statement of this
position is the 2000 Cartagena Protocol, which holds that uncertainty "shall
not prevent the Party from taking" regulatory action.7'
3. Response
Critics of the precautionary principle often misrepresent its regulatory
standard as unitary and draconian: to ban or forgo an activity or technology
altogether. Neither the texts of the precautionary principle nor the writings of
its advocates bear this out.7 Bans may be appropriate in some cases, but in
others it may mean process controls, field tests, limited periods of approval,
pre-release testing, investigation of alternatives, or further research. Early
versions of the precautionary principle did, however, look to eliminate or
minimize potential threats to the environment,72 much as the United States
67 Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 50, art. 174(2).
68 Bamako Convention supra note 27, art. 4(3)(f).
69 Bergen Declaration, supra note 26. See also Second World Climate Conference, supra
note 48; Biodiversity Convention, supra note 42, pmbl.; Climate Change Convention, supra
note 40, art. 3(3); Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. GAOR, 6th
Sess., art 6(2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 164/37 (1995), http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UTNDOC/
GEN/N95/274/67/PDF/N9527467.pdfOpenElement (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
70 Cartagena Protocol, supra note 2, arts. 10.6, 11.8, 39 I.L.M. at 1031-32.
7' See, e.g., Freestone & Hey, Implemention, supra note 17, at 250-59; Levidow et al., supra
note 17; Noellkaemper, supra note 17, at 77-79; Jordan & O'Riordan, supra note 12, at 25-
26, 30.
72 Nordic Council Declaration, supra note 25 (1989); Montreal Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, Sept. 16, 1987, pmbl.,
30 I.L.M. 541; Vienna Convention, supra note 22, (1985); World Charter for Nature, U.N.
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Clean Water Act speaks of a goal of eliminating water pollution73 or the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") speaks of "minimizing"
threats to human health and the environment.7" The minimization language
appears in subsequent instruments as well, including the Earth Summit
treaties 75 and even the very recent Cartagena Protocol. 76
By 1992, however, the acceptance of some optimal level of risk,
usually determined by reference to costs and benefits, became common.
Severity, cost, and risk tradeoffs do not appear in early conventions.77 In
1991, however, the OECD spoke of "mitigating risk," that is, lowering but
not reducing it,78 and the Rio Declaration speaks of"cost-effective" measures
to prevent harm.79 Other treaties specify measures "commensurate" to the risk
presented. 0 The European Commission insisted that responses be
"proportionate"--both in the sense of benefits and costs (broadly understood)
and of the desired level of protection-to the threat, based on a preliminary
cost-benefit analysis."' The use of the term "as appropriate" in the relevant
section of the Cartagena Protocol also suggests proportionality.
GAOR, 37th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 21, princ. 11, 22 I.L.M. 455.
13 33 U.S.C. §§1251(a)(6),(b), 1311(b)(2)(A) (2000). This was always a goal, never a
mandate.
74 42 U.S.C. §6924(m)(1)(2000); See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d
355, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that "minimize" refers to an even lower risk level than
the "acceptable" level).
7' Biodiversity Convention, supra note 42; Climate Change Convention, supra note 40.
76 Cartagena Protocol, supra note 2, arts. 10.6, 11.8.
17 E.g., Transboundary Lakes Convention, supra note 41 (1992); Biodiversity Convention,
supra note 42 (1992); OSPAR, supra note 47 (1992); Bamako Convention, supra note 27,
(1991).
78 OECD Council Recommendation, supra note 29.
7' Rio Declaration, supra note 1, princ. 15. Agenda 21, supra note 23, the action plan
appended to the Rio Declaration, speaks of response actions "which are justified in their own
right." Presumably this is an oblique reference to the cost-effectiveness standard. Id. 35.3.
Further, Rio acknowledged the relevance of development needs ("according to their
capacities") as a limitation on the appropriate response. Rio Declaration, supra note 1, princ.
15. See also Second World Climate Conference, supra note 48.
"0 Climate Change Convention, supra note 48; Montreal Protocol, supra note 49.
SI Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 4-5, 18-20.




Early versions of the precautionary principle were silent on the
question whether, by taking action on the basis of present uncertainty,
regulatory authorities are obliged to revisit their decisions as new information
becomes available. The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer is a notable, and interesting, exception. 3 A framework treaty
that was structured to be progressively implemented by subsequent protocols,
it very much looks to future regulatory action. Its preamble states that parties
are,
determined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary
measures... with the ultimate objective of their [i.e., ozone-
depleting substances] elimination on the basis of
developments in scientific knowledge, taking into account
technical and economic considerations.
8 4
The Convention clearly anticipates that increasing knowledge and technology
will indicate further reductions (rather than increases) in ozone-depleting
substances, as has in fact happened. To implement this expectation, the
Convention anticipates regularly returning to the currently uncertain
questions for further action.
Immediately subsequent versions of the precautionary principle did
not follow this lead, presumably because they concentrate on the present, and
the need to take regulatory action under uncertainty dominates the present.
Since a core function of the precautionary principle is to justify regulatory
action in the face present uncertainty, such action is necessarily somewhat
Rules, 13 TUL. ENVTL L.J. 271, 298-301 (2000).
" In addition, the OECD Council Recommendation on Water Resource Management
Policies: Integration, Demand, Management, and Groundwater Protection, C(89)12 (final),
pt. VII(19), reprinted in, BASIC DOCUMENTSOF INTERNATIONALENVIRONMENTALLAW Doc.
30e, (Harold Hohmann ed. 1992), speaks of "interim protection measures to proceed
concurrently with further research."
"Vienna Convention, supra note 22, pmbl. (emphasis added).
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tentative, as further understanding may well reveal it to be too strict or too
lenient.8 5 Structurally, then, iteration has always been implicit in the
precautionary principle. The post-Rio, trade-related SPS Agreement first
made it explicit:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a
Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary
measures on the basis of available pertinent information
.... In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the
additional information necessary for a more objective
assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary
measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.16
Likewise, the European Commission requires precautionary measures to be
"periodically reviewed" in light of available scientific information. The recent
Cartagena Protocol is similarly structured, but it does not use the term
"provisional" and gives no indication of a time limit. The common feature of
all of these variations is that the precautionary principle anticipates revisiting
judgments based on it. Uncertainty may be unavoidable, but it is not
desirable. 7
The placement of the burden of proof in producing and evaluating the
new information is a separate question. Many observers had inferred from the
timing element that the proponent of an activity or technology bears the
85 Geistfeld calls these wrong guesses the error costs of regulating uncertainty, and the
precautionary principle's function is to allocate the error costs between risk creators and
potential victims. Geistfeld, supra note 9, at 11,331.
86 SPS Agreement, supra note 30, art. 5.7 (emphasis added).
87 Two recent American studies of risk assessment and management have recommended an
iterative or cycling process of investigation, regulation, and learning. 2 PRESIDENTIAL/CONG.
COMM'N ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND MGMT., RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN
REGULATORYDECSION-MAKING 7,32 (1997);NAT'LREEARCH COUNCI, UNDERSTANDING
RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 163-64. See also Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's
Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 938-42 (2002) (advocating
mandatory post-decision monitoring of environmental effects).
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burden of proving its safety."8 The more recent statements of the
precautionary principle, however, take the opposite view. The SPS
Agreement states that it is the regulator's responsibility to justify continued
restrictions. The European Commission declares that precautionary measures
themselves "may assign responsibility for producing the scientific evidence
necessary for a comprehensive risk evaluation," thus retaining the preexisting
burdens of proof, for instance, on manufacturers of drugs but not of industrial
chemicals.8 9
5. Conclusion
By breaking the precautionary principle down into its constituent
elements, we can better see how its requirements have changed over time.
None of the factors that have been proposed to explain the variation in the
precautionary principle-degree of obligation, geographic or political scope,
type of activity, differing authors, chronology-explains all the data
8 The timing element in effect places the initial burden of demonstrating some degree of
certainty on the proponent of the activity or technology, because without such a
demonstration precautionary action may be taken. See Margo Brett Baender, Pesticides and
Precaution: The Bamako Convention as a Model For An International Convention on
Pesticides Regulation, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 557, 588 (1991); Cranor, supra note 14,
at 74, 86-96; PROTECTING PUBUC HEALTH, supra note 12, 1-11; Jordan & O'Riordan, supra
note 12, at 24-25; David Ozonoff, The Precautionary Principle as a Screening Device, in
PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 12, at 100, 101-04. See also HOHMANN, supra note
3, at 334-35 (burden shifting represents the "strong version" of the Precautionary principle).
For arguments pro and con see TROUWBORST, supra note 3, 14-15 (2002). No serious
advocate of the precautionary principle, however, suggests that the proponent of the activity
must conclusively demonstrate a zero risk of harm. The European Commission, on the other
hand, requires the regulator to demonstrate uncertainty as a prerequisite to application of the
precautionary principle.
The silence on burden of proof in the Rio and most other formulations, as well as
the idea that the precautionary principle operates as a "reason" for not "postponing"
regulatory action, might suggest that the precautionary principle relates only to timing and
that it otherwise functions within an existing framework of burdens of proof. It cannot be
said, therefore, that reversal of the burden of proof is necessarily part of the precautionary
principle as actually adopted.
89 Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 20-22.
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perfectly; there are counter-examples to each. Nevertheless, an examination
of these factors demonstrates that the direction of the change is broadly
consistent. In each element, strong requirements have been replaced by
weaker ones which add prerequisites, that moderate responses, or require
revisitation of regulation. Further, this change reflects a persistent,
announced, and often successful effort by the United States and economic
interests to tame what they regard as an unruly, unpredictable9" standard
which can be and has been used to justify inefficient, protectionist,
misguided, and even perverse regulatory action.91
I. FROM HAZARD To RISK
If the first criticism of the precautionary principle is its indefiniteness,
the second criticism is the supposed rigidity that leads to irrational and
counterproductive results. 92 "When in doubt, ban it" is the repeated
caricature, and commentators have asserted that its application would have
doomed useful and life-saving products like penicillin. As we have seen, this
is a caricature of the precautionary principle, though there are examples of the
principle being deployed with little regard to its consequences, for example,
in Zambia's refusal to accept genetically modified crops to feed its starving
population. 93 There is some tension between the two criticisms-if it is so
undefined, how can it be so rigid? if there is nothing there, why is it such a
dangerous idea?-but they are also related in an important way. The multiple
versions of the precautionary principle bespeak considerable flexibility in
expressing and interpreting it, and that flexibility can be exploited to
moderate its effects. It is precisely because of its malleability that the
90 Aarti Gupta, Advance Informed Agreement: A Shared Basis for Governing Trade in
Genetically Modified Organisms?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 265, 265-66 (2001)
[hereinafter Gupta, Advance Informed Agreement].
91 E.g., Gail Charnley & E. Donald Elliott, Risk Versus Precaution: Environmental Law and
Public Health Protection, [2002 Transfer Binder] 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,363,
10,364-66; Cross, supra note 7; Graham, supra note 7; Wiener, supra note 19, at 1518-21.
92 1d.
9' 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) Update No. 25 (Sept. 9, 2002); Marc Lacey, Engineering
Food for Africans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, http://ipm.osu.edu/trans/092_081 .htm.
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precautionary principle finds itself in the position of being reinterpreted and
tamed.
While the change has occurred at the elemental level, as we have
seen, it also occurs, perhaps more importantly, at the level of complete
statements of the principle. Per Sandin, who also analyzed the precautionary
principle by dividing it into four elements, notes that weakness or imprecision
in one element determines the overall weakness or imprecision of a particular
formulation of the principle. It is thus a mistake, he warns, to look at each
element in isolation; rather, one must look at the combination of all of the
elements in a particular version of the principle.94 Sandin's point is well
taken, insofar as he is describing the overall effect of choices of wording for
each element, and this Part adopts his recommended methodology. The
holistic methodology has the added advantage of allowing us to see in the
changes in the precautionary principle the reflection of a more fundamental
change in the way that environmental dangers are regulated.
The nature of the fundamental change is familiar to students of
environmental law. I will adopt Lakshman Guruswamy's labels--"hazard"
versus "risk"-and his succinct description of the difference:
While used interchangeably in common parlance, "risk" and
"hazard" have distinct meanings in the risk analysis literature.
"Hazard" is the intrinsic potential of an agent to cause an
adverse effect, whereas "risk" is the likelihood and magnitude
of the adverse effect occurring under real-world exposure
scenarios. While many earlier regulatory decisions were based
on hazard identification, there has been increasing realization
that a fuller characterization of risk usually provides a better
basis for making regulatory decisions.95
9 Sandin, supra note 12, at 896-98.
95 Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Sustainable Agriculture: Do GMOs Imperil Biosafety?, 9 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 461, 484 (2002). Joe Thornton describes a Risk Paradigm and an
Ecological Paradigm, which roughly correspond to the risk and hazard paradigms here.
THORNTON, supra note 66, at 7-13.
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Guruswamy's distinction is particularly useful because he developed it to
describe international legal reactions to GMOs, an area dominated by the
precautionary principle, or at least precautionary rhetoric. He also recognizes
the general movement from hazard to risk in regulatory decision making. So,
to use Guruswamy's terminology, this Article now traces the evolution of the
precautionary principle from hazard to risk by examining four complete,
influential expressions of the precautionary principle.
A. The Hazard Paradigm
1. Hazard-Based Precaution
Guruswamy observes that the precautionary principle, "at least as
defended by some of its strongest proponents, would appear to be directed at
hazard, as opposed to risk, by calling for precautionary measures once some
indicia of hazard exist."96 The hazard paradigm tends to view new
technologies and large-scale human activities as derangements of the
environmental status quo, with unforeseeable and frequently negative
consequences for human health and the environment.97 Accordingly, the
hazard paradigm is determined to minimize, rather than optimize,
environmental harm.98 It represents a high degree of risk aversion99 and
rejects an approach that attempts to derive a "correct" or efficient level of
harm from factors like costs, benefits, and comparison of other risks. The
hazard paradigm does not aspire to a zero-risk world (a favorite accusation
by its critics). That is impossible, of course, and many obviously desirable
technologies-prescription drugs, for example-have associated risks.
9' Guruswamy, supra note 95, at 484. He characterizes this version of the precautionary
principle as "a major leap backward." Id.
9 7 E.g., THORNTON, supra note 66, at 9-17, 343-49.
98 HOHMANN, supra note 3, at 11. Skeptics of the precautionary principle urge just the
reverse. See e.g., Wiener, supra note 19, at 1524.
99 Pearce, The Precautionary Principle and Economic Analysis, in INTERPRETING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 132.
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Rather, the goal is to keep technological risks to the lowest possible level,
usually by avoiding the product or activity of concern.
The determination to minimize and avoid harm has two bases. The
first and more important is the recognition of the limitations of present
science and knowledge as they relate to environmental causes and effects.
Professor Plater puts it this way:
Unless you are pretty sure that the background foundational
equilibria will not be disrupted, or that the negative
consequences will be foreseeable, minor, and mitigatable, you
had better be sure that what you proposed to do is worth the
potential costs; it is safer not to risk casually the escalating
domino consequences that may follow. In this regard Carson
showed that moving from a human-centered, master-of-nature
perspective to the holistic, human-species-as-constituent-part-
of-nature is not just an ethical idea, it is fundamentally
practical and utilitarian as well.'°°
Theo Colborn, in her indictment of hormone-disrupting chemicals, explains:
This caution does not arise from any propensity for pessimism
or dislike of technology. It arises from the very nature of our
global experiment and from our inescapable ignorance, which
makes it impossible to foresee consequences or guarantee
safety. The dilemma is simply stated: the Earth did not come
with a blueprint or an instruction book. When we conduct
experiments on a global scale by releasing billions of pounds
of synthetic chemicals, we are tinkering with immensely
complex systems that we will neverfully comprehend. If there
is a lesson in the ozone hole and our experience with
'
00 Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory
and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 981, 1000 (1994).
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hormone-disrupting chemicals, it is this: as we speed toward
the future, we are flying blind."'
Our basic understanding of the cause-and-effect relationships in the
environment and human health is weak enough. Complexity and non-linear,
unpredictable effects in a system in which everything is connected to
everything else generate a fundamental, irreducible uncertainty.0 2 It is a
dangerous mistake, in this view, to attempt to "fine tune" regulatory measures
to achieve optimally efficient or optimally risky levels of protection.0 3
Whatever other faults such an approach might have," 4 its precision is
illusory, and the process of elaborately considering costs, benefits, and
countervailing risks is really the process of compromising human health and
the environment.
The second reason for minimization and avoidance is a degree of
technological pessimism,'0 5  Colbom's statement to the contrary
notwithstanding. The enormous potency of twentieth century
technologies-nuclear and fossil-fuel energy, ozone-depleting substances,
synthetic organic pesticides-degraded the environment and threatened
human health on a global scale. The effects cannot be easily or quickly
reversed, and some, like nuclear waste, seem intractable. This is not some
kind of neo-Luddism; it is simply skepticism of new technologies that have
harmful potential.
It follows from the goal of minimizing harm and the recognition of
uncertainty that hazard-based precaution accepts error on the side of
101 THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE 242-43 (1997) (emphasis added). Aldo
Leopold used a characteristically homely image: "To keep every cog and wheel as the first
precaution of intelligent tinkering." Id. (emphasis added).
102 O'Riordan & Cameron, supra note 12, at 5.
103 Santillo et al., supra note 66, at 37-39; Malcolm MacGarvin, Precaution, Science and the
Sin of Hubris, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 12.
"o And they are many. See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk
Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988); Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory
Efficiency: Implementation of Un iform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms,
37 STAN. L. REv. 1267 (1985).
'05 Applegate, Prometheus Principle, supra note 12, at 214-15.
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overprotection as preferable to the reverse. It prefers the avoidance of new
technologies and activities that have some likelihood of generating such
harm." 6 Preventing harm before it occurs is also a practical justification for
precaution-it's hard to get the toothpaste back into the tube, or the CFCs out
of the stratosphere. As a result, the central principle of precautionary action
is early regulatory action, in advance of scientific certainty, to restrict the
proposed activity or to give it thorough consideration, or both. The strongest
versions of the precautionary principle would place the burden of proof of
safety on the proponent of a technology or activity. Under uncertainty, the
advocate of endangering the status quo should demonstrate the wisdom of so
doing.
The foregoing is a sketch of an approach that has been elaborated
elsewhere in great detail. One qualification, therefore, needs to be repeated:
the hazard paradigm does not reject all new technology regardless of large
potential benefits (penicillin, an AIDS vaccine) or small potential risks. The
world is full of technology and technological innovation, and life expectancy
and quality of life are, in most (but not all) of the world, at levels that were
inconceivable a century or two ago. Rather, the hazard paradigm casts a
skeptical eye on new technologies with largely economic benefits and with
a potential for serious, widespread damage. New technologies may be the
savior or the scourge of the globe. Given plausible reasons for concern, the
hazard paradigm asks for some assurance that it is the former before we are
irretrievably committed to accepting the latter.
2. The Bamako Convention
The Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the
Control ofTransboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
within Africa'0 7 was signed in 1991 as a reaction to the perceived weakness
of the earlier Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
06 Thornton characterizes this as a "well-founded suspicion with a body of circumstantial
evidence to back it up." THORNTON, supra note 66, at 113.
107 Bamako Convention, supra note 27.
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of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. I"8 Many critics of the Basel
Convention, which had widespread support among industrialized nations,
thought that it in effect invited industrialized nations to export hazardous
waste to less developed nations, because it only required prior informed
consent. The Bamako Convention sought to remedy that weakness: "[A]I1
Parties shall take appropriate legal, administrative, and other measures.. . to
prohibit the import of all hazardous wastes, for any reason, into Africa from
non-Contracting Parties. Such import shall be deemed illegal and a criminal
act.,,10
The blanket prohibition on importation was followed by a
precautionary approach to the management of existing waste:
Each Party shall strive to adopt and implement the preventive,
precautionary approach to pollution problems which entails,
inter-alia, preventing the release into the environment of
substances which may cause harm to humans or the
environment without waiting for scientific proof regarding
such harm. The parties shall cooperate ... to implement the
precautionary principle to pollution prevention.., rather than
the pursuit of a permissible emissions approach based on
assimilative capacity assumptions ... i0
Even though it has not yet entered into force, the Bamako Convention is
important because it represents a strongly protective environmental treaty that
originated in the developing world. The exportation of hazardous waste from
North to South is widely viewed-and universally viewed in the South-as
a particularly egregious form of economic and environmental imperialism.
Prohibited by their former colonies' independence from pillaging the former
colonies' natural resources to enrich their own industries, the industrialized
countries now use them as a low-cost resource for disposing of industrial
wastes. In both cases, the North receives enormous economic benefit, and the
'08 Basel Convention, supra note 28.
'09 Bamako Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(1)(f).
110 Id. art. 4(3)(f).
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South receives little benefit and much harm.I" As a result, one can expect a
South-sponsored treaty on this subject to be particularly aggressive.
Bamako invokes the hazard-based precautionary principle. Its trigger
is the importation of hazardous wastes, "for any reason," into Africa."'
Hazardous wastes are defined broadly by listing, characteristics, and national
designation." 3 The convention triggers action against hazardous wastes per
se, not in context. That is, it treats all such wastes as equally dangerous in
themselves, rather than dangerous in different degrees or only under
conditions of exposure to human beings at or above certain levels. Moreover,
while there is some threshold of proof in the requirement that the substances
be those which "may cause harm to humans or the environment,"' 114 missing
is the idea in weaker versions of the precautionary principle that regulatory
action is justified only in advance of "full scientific certainty" (e.g., Rio
Principle 15)."' The "full certainty" language means that regulatory action
will occur only when all that is missing is full certainty. "6 Because it does not
contain this limitation, the Bamako version should be read to require a
minimum of scientific evidence on which the timing decision is based, a
further reflection of the hazard paradigm.
The timing requirement reinforces the hazard-based approach of the
trigger. The language of Bamako's version of the precautionary principle
speaks twice of prevention, that is, avoiding harm entirely before it is
realized."7 The temporal focus is further reflected in its particular
formulation of the relationship between uncertainty and regulatory action:
... Cheng Zheng-Kang, Equity, Special Considerations, and the Third World, 1 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 57 (1990); Daniel Barstow Magraw, The International Law
Commission 's Study of International Liability for Nonprohibited Acts as it Relates to
Developing States, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1041, 1049-51 (1986).
'
2 Bamako Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(1).
113 Id. art. 2.
"4 id. art. 4(3)(f) (emphasis added).
"5 Rio Declaration supra note 1, princ. 15.
116 The Rio version is thus quite weak in this respect, because "full scientific certainty" is a
rarity in environmental regulation. Sandin supra note 12, at 892-94, 901.
.. Bamako Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(3).
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"without waiting for scientific proof."'" 8 The language, in other words,
forcefully adopts the anticipatory approach that characterizes the strong
version of the precautionary principle. " 9
The Bamako regulatory response is that the importation of hazardous
waste into Africa is banned period. Indeed, it "shall be deemed illegal and
a criminal act."' 20 This, of course, is the strong form of the precautionary
principle, based on the view that the only way to minimize the impact of
hazardous waste is to avoid contact with it altogether. This view is reflected
and underscored in Bamako's formal statement of the precautionary principle,
which adopts "pollution prevention . . . rather than the pursuit of a
permissible emissions approach based on assimilative capacity
assumptions." ' Minimization of harm is characteristic of the hazard
paradigm, as is the clear rejection of an approach to risk that seeks to
determine a particular level at which human beings and the environmehit can
no longer tolerate additional exposure without unacceptable harmful
effects.'22
The convention does not entirely lend itself to the hazard-risk
dichotomy. The response element is indeed strongly precautionary as it
relates to importation of hazardous waste; however, the convention concerns
itself equally with the management of hazardous waste generated in Africa.
As to such wastes, the convention's standard is not an outright ban on
generation, but rather a requirement that it be managed in an
"environmentally sound" manner, meaning "taking all practicable steps to
ensure" management "in a manner which will protect human health and the
environment against the adverse effects which may result from such
IS Id. art. 4(3)() (emphasis added).
19 Applegate, Precautionary Preference, supra note 12, at 417.
'o Bamako Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(1). The treaty is open for membership only to
members of the Organization for African Unity, arts. 22-23, so the absolute ban cannot be
avoided by joining the convention, as in the Basel Convention.
.2 Bamako Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(3)(f.
122 Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 303, 305 (1992)
[hereinafter Hey, Precautionary Concept]; Santillo et al., supra note 66, at 37-38 (rejecting
possibility that risks can be managed to precise "acceptable" levels).
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wastes."' 123 While these are relatively strong statements ("effects which may
result"), the practicability qualification is significant, especially in developing
states where what is practicable may be extremely limited. Although it is still
fair to regard the Bamako Convention, taken as a whole, as staking out the
hazard-based approach to the precautionary principle, it is important to
recognize that even here the precautionary principle represents less than
absolute stringency. It is also noteworthy that the Bamako Convention has not
yet entered into force, suggesting perhaps that enthusiasm for such strictness
has waned over time.
The Bamako Convention is predictably silent on iteration, the relative
newcomer to the precautionary principle. Iteration is an impossibility in
connection with the importation ban, as the convention gives no suggestion
that such a ban will be reconsidered at any time in the future, even if, for
instance, a party were to develop the capacity to detoxify or store imported
wastes in a demonstrably safe and secure manner. It can, however, be inferred
from the familiar formulation, "without waiting for scientific proof regarding
such harm," in connection with waste management. 24 Amendments to the
convention are expressly permitted, and the amendment provision strikingly
parallels--or completes-this language in Bamako's precautionary principle:
"Such amendments shall take due account, inter alia, of relevant scientific,
technical, environmental, and social considerations."' 25 This sentence implies,
perhaps, an expectation that the main body of the treaty, as well as the annex
listing specific wastes, will be revisited. 126 Moreover, even this version of the
precautionary principle does not reject the idea of scientific proof; it is simply
a rule about timing. By not rejecting the possibility of scientific proof either
way, it leaves the door open for proof of safety. It is, however, open no more
than a crack in the Bamako Convention, because the rejection of the
assimilative capacity approach certainly suggests that the burden of proof lies
with those who would demonstrate safety.
123 Bamako Convention, supra note 27, arts. 4(3)(d), 1(10) (definition).
124 Id. art. 4(3)(f).
121Id. art. 17(1).
326 Amendment of annexes is subject to article 17. Id. art. 18(2)(a).
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The Bamako Convention, in sum, represents the hazard-based
approach to the precautionary principle. In its absolute ban on the
importation of hazardous waste into Africa and its rejection of the
assimilative approach to management ofhazardous waste generated in Africa,
it embodies the view that hazards per se are to be avoided in order to
minimize their effects on humans and the environment. The authorship and
the pariah status of hazardous waste importation help to explain the adoption
of a strong, hazard-based precautionary principle in the Bamako Convention.
B. The Risk Paradigm
Risk-based precaution begins as a critique of the absolutism of the
hazard paradigm, which creates "the potential for arbitrary, unfair, and
inefficient regulations.'1 7 The growth of the risk paradigm has been traced
in detail elsewhere, 28 so no more than highlights are presented here.
1. The Rise of the Risk Paradigm
The fundamental reason for the progressive replacement of the hazard
paradigm by the risk paradigm was dissatisfaction with the hazard paradigm's
bi-modal (on-off, safe-unsafe) approach to potential environmental hari. The
recognition, for example, that many toxic chemicals have no discernible
threshold at which they cease to have adverse effects led to the conclusion
"27 Guruswamy, supra note 95, at 484. For sustained critiques of the precautionary principle
along these lines, see sources cited in note 7, supra.
128 DESADELEER, supra note 14, at 91 (tracing development from remedial action to
prevention to precaution); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERTL. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION
AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 3-13 (2003) [hereinafter SHAPIRO &
GUCKSMAN]. John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory
Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 264-66 (1991) [hereinafter
Applegate, Perils]; Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law. A Normative
Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 565-84 (1992); Donald T.
Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of




that a zero-risk standard was impossible to achieve in an industrial economy.
In the United States, for example, Congress began to adopt legal standards
that accept a greater-than-zero level of residual (i.e., post-regulation) risk,
usually determined by considering social preferences, alternative risks,
technical feasibility, and cost. As utilitarian-economic analysis increasingly
came to dominate regulatory decision making, the overarching regulatory
goal became achieving the most efficient (however defined) level of harm to
humans and the environment. The hazard paradigm, in this view, deprives
society of technologies and activities that have enormous net social value by
simplistically abjuring anything that has dangers associated with it.
As Wiener argues in his contribution to this symposium, extreme risk
aversion can be not only inefficient (we could put our resources to better
effect elsewhere) but may also be perverse. 9 One need not accept all of
Wiener's arguments to recognize the validity of his fundamental point that
maintenance of the status quo itself involves risks to human health and the
environment, and thus that both the choices to regulate and not to regulate
create or accept certain risks. 3 ' To take the strongest case, the decision to
approve a polio vaccine involves risks both ways, and so a no-risk goal is
simply incoherent. Whether anyone other than a rhetorical straw man has ever
actually imagined or advocated a risk-free world is doubtful, and the
frequency of perverse results can be overstated. Nevertheless, it is clear, and
the risk paradigm takes it as fundamental, that risk regulation cannot be
reduced to simple, one-dimensional rules.
The risk paradigm is in this respect both a reaction against the hazard
paradigm and a reflection of a strongly utilitarian (often economic)
worldview.13 1 The goal of the regulatory system is to optimize, rather than
simply minimize, risk. As Professor Wiener puts it, one can observe in
international environmental law "the move from the absolutist 'precautionary
principle' toward a more pragmatic 'optimalprecaution' as precaution must
129 Wiener, supra note 19 at 1518-21. See also Cross, supra note 7.
130 Wiener, supra note 19, at 1518-21. See also Cross, supra note 7.
... SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 128, at 8-11 ; John S. Applegate, Worst Things First:
Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALEJ. ON REG.
277, 289-96 (1992).
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confront the reality of a multi-risk world."'32 This starts with, but goes
beyond, rejection of the zero-risk model. Some level of risk is to be embraced
to achieve net social gains. Building tunnels and skyscrapers entail high
degrees of risk, but on balance we are better off with than without them.
Flexible plastic may pose carcinogenic and reproductive risks from the feed
material and the plasticizer, respectively, but these plastics are essential for
a myriad of useful purposes. There is little to be said for hazardous or
radioactive waste as such, but they are the inevitable consequence of
extremely useful activities that enhance wealth and well-being. Moreover, the
case for optimizing risk can be made not only by comparing risk and wealth
(quality of life) enhancement, but also in terms of risk reduction itself. The
optimal level of risk is the lowest net risk, so even a fairly risky behavior is
desirable if it reduces other risks even more. In this view, the cancer risks of
chlorination by-products in drinking water, for example, are more than offset
by the reduction in risks of bacterial infection (cholera, among others) from
untreated water. 133
The risk approach is undergirded by the utilitarian-economic view that
decentralized, competitive markets are the best means of achieving these
optimal solutions. 34 The commitment to market mechanisms may seem
rather abstract, but in fact it is directly relevant. If the market determines and
legitimates optimal risk choices, it follows that interference in the operation
132 Wiener, supra note 19, at 1524 (emphasis added).
' Susan W. Putnam & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Seeking Safe Drinking Water, in RISK vS.
RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTNG HEALTH AND THEENVIRONMENT, 124-48 (John D. Graham
& Jonathan Baert Weiner, eds. 1995). The same can be said of the DDT-malaria trade-off.
Of course, these trade-offs can be-and often are-overdrawn. There may be-and often
are-third alternatives (ozonation of drinking water, treated netting) that can avoid both
risks. The existence of such alternatives is an empirical question in each case, and their
desirability can also be measured by their net risk reduction. One purpose of the
precautionary principle is to encourage the search for such alternatives. See Mary O'Brien,
Alternatives Assessment: Part of Operationalizing and Institutionalizing the Precautionary
Principle, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 12, at 208-10; THORNTON, supra note
66, at 346-49.
' Hohmann argues that the original appearance of the precautionary principle represented
the shift from an economic to an ecological basis of environmental law. HOHMANN, supra
note 3, at 4-5, 10-12. In these terms, the principle is returning to the economic basis.
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of the market should be minimized. The status quo of the risk paradigm is a
market unencumbered by external regulation.3  Regulation, not new
technology, is the derangement, and so it is incumbent on such regulation to
justify itself '36 Moreover, when regulation is proposed, it must be tested by
cost-benefit analysis to impose a kind of surrogate market discipline on
regulators who are otherwise operating outside of the market. The goal is not,
of course, to mimic the market for its own sake, but to pursue the general
goal of efficient allocation of resources, measured in terms of satisfying
individual wants.'37
The risk paradigm also values a systematic approach to regulation that
asks efficiency questions, generates data to answer them, and is ruled by such
answers. A central element of this technocratic approach is what Donald
Homstein has called synopticism, 138 that is, examining all aspects of a
problem thoroughly before reaching a decision that seeks to consider and
make the best of all of its aspects. Such analysis, especially as it becomes
more complex and fine-grained, requires the deployment of common metrics
that quantify the relevant factors. Risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis,
in fact, were developed to facilitate the shift from hazard-based regulation to
risk-based regulation.'39 Likewise, the consideration of countervailing risks
requires the identification and quantification of all intended and expected
consequences (i.e., reduction of risk from the activity or product to be
restricted), as well as second- and third-order consequences that may not be
intuitively obvious or expected.
The risk approach, committed as it is to the market and to the tools of
economic and risk analysis, is also founded on a strong technological
"' Steve Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk
Approach to Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 957, 970 (2001).
136 Id. at 974.
' For a survey of economic definitions of efficiency and advocacy of a basic utilitarian
approach, see Calandrillo, supra note 135, at 969-77, 980-86. For sustained critiques of
economic/utilitarian efficiency as the goal of environmental regulation, see MARK SAGOFF,
THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988), and SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 128.
1"8 Hornstein, Reclaiming, supra note 128, at 580-84; Hornstein, Lessons, supra note 128,
at 386-88. See also APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 65, at 165-72.
' Applegate, Perils, supra note 128, at 277.
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optimism. Social welfare has demonstrably increased (in the aggregate, at
least in the industrialized North), and our embrace of new technologies and
their risks has everything to do with the increased welfare. 40 The risk
approach is thus committed, also, to the scientific paradigm that has
developed in western culture since the Renaissance and Enlightenment. The
scientific method, with its preference for quantification and its insistence on
the development of falsifiable hypotheses for rigorously testing knowledge,
underlies our present technology-based prosperity; therefore, this method
should also be used to understand the consequences of that technology. 4'
2. Risk-Based Precaution
The consequences of the risk paradigm for protective regulation are
profound. Risk-based precaution does not limit itself to considering the
inherent danger of an activity or product, but rather seeks to optimize the
overall risks and benefits to society of the technology in its full context.
Risks, costs, benefits, and alternative risks are essential to judging whether
regulatory action is advisable and the nature and degree of such action. It
follows that regulatory action should be based on prior, thorough
consideration of the multitude of relevant considerations. "Regulate first, ask
questions later" is anathema, because it invites arbitrary, subjective, and
inefficient regulation. While risk-based precaution still accepts the basic idea
of acting to prevent harm before it occurs-that is, unacceptable levels of
harm-it is wary of anticipatory action in advance of proof of the existence
of a risk in the first place.'42 The preference for market mechanisms in
establishing environmental standards intensifies the concern about premature
140 Applegate, Prometheus Principle, supra note 12, at 222-26.
141 There are alternative sciences or alternative approaches to science which emphasize
induction from widespread observation (Colborn) and also de-emphasize quantification.
These are described in Katherine Barrett & Carolyn Raffensperger, Precautionary Science,
in PROTECTING PuBLIc HEALTH supra note 12; THORNTON, supra note 66, at 410. For a
superb analysis of competing modes of science and their consequences, see SHELDON
KRIMSKY, HORMONALCHAOS: THE SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
ENDOCRINE HYPOTHESIS 227-34 (2000).
142 THORNTON, supra note 66, at 8.
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action. Interference with the market ought to be exceptional and only
undertaken with care. Therefore, the burden of justifying precautionary
intervention appropriately lies with the regulator, as does the burden of
justifying continuance of such restrictions over time.
Risk-based precaution employs the technocratic tools of risk
assessment, cost-benefit analysis, and comparative risk assessment to
consider as quantitatively and rigorously as possible all of the factors that
might serve to make a precise determination.'43 Substantively, the risk
paradigm holds that it is better to permit activities up to the point at which
they do unacceptable harm, than to delay or refuse them altogether. In this
respect, the risk-based approach is what the Bamako Convention aptly calls
the assimilative capacity approach.'" In line with the technocratic approach,
regulation is justified by reference to "sound science," that is, proof of cause
and effect using the traditional scientific method.145 Other sciences or
nonquantitative methodologies are to be viewed with skepticism, if not
hostility.'46 David Fidler, in fact, calls this approach the "science paradigm"
for resolving disputes and making decisions. 147
"" For example, in its challenge to EPA's recent rulemaking under the Clean Air Act,
industry repeatedly argued that EPA had failed "to quantify precisely" the relevant elements
of its decision. Arm Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 369, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The
court rejected these arguments; however, other courts in other settings have been more
receptive. See, e.g., Gulf South Insulation v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d
1137, 1146 (5th Cir. 1983) ("precise estimates"); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d
1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
144 TROUWBORST, supra note 3, at 19. See also THORNTON, supra note 66, at 7. Geistfeld's
approach to the precautionary principle, which embraces risk and cost analysis, is unusual
in that proponents usually reject these techniques. Geistfeld, however, would allow the
potential victims to set the values that are plugged into these techniques, Geistfeld, supra
note 9, at 11,333, a maneuver that proponents of the risk paradigm would undoubtedly reject
as not "objective."
141 See Gupta, Advance Informed Agreement, supra note 90, at 272-80, for an excellent
discussion of the ideology of science in the international regulation of GMOs.
146 See KRIMSKY, supra note 141, at 190-94.
,47 David P. Fidler, Challenges to Humanity's Health The Contributions of International
Environmental Law to National and Global Public Health, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,048, 10,070 (2001).
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The risk paradigm regards the precautionary principle, being a
response to uncertainty, as at best a temporary substitute for real analysis.
Synoptic analysis does not cope well, either theoretically or practically, with
uncertainty.'48 Uncertainty is a way station along the road to optimal policies,
and the precautionary principle fills an awkward gap in an otherwise synoptic
regulatory decision making process. Hence risk-based precaution emphasizes
iteration, the fourth element of precautionary decision making. The regulator
must continually update the available information, as the burden lies with it
to justify continued restrictions. And, coming full circle, the implication for
the first element (the trigger) is that the precautionary principle may be
deployed only in well defined circumstances. Risk-based versions of the
precautionary principle, for example, frequently limit its application to
"irreversible" harm, that is, those effects which can only be addressed in
advance. '49
3. The SPS Agreement
The consequences of the risk paradigm for protective regulation are
as apparent as they are profound in the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement"), adopted in 1993 as part of the
suite of treaties governing the activities of the World Trade Organization
("WTO").15 ° Free trade is the darling of the international community, or at
.4 This is why Lindblom felt it was necessary to develop a coherent theory of incrementalism
("muddling through") to deal with situations of limited knowledge. For a fuller discussion
of the problem of bounded rationality, see SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 128, at
22-25.
" See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 1, princ. 15 ("serious or irreversible").
Commentators, too, have tended to favor an irreversibility threshold, as it most clearly
justifies taking early regulatory action. See, e.g., Phillippe Sands, The "Greening" of
International Law: Emerging Principles and Rules, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293-323
(1994). Kiss speaks of the need to protect future generations from long-lasting, irreversible
harms. Alexandre Kiss, Rights and Interests of Future Generations, in THE CHALLENGE OF
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 4, at 27. Christopher Stone, who is otherwise quite skeptical
of the precautionary principle, recognizes the need to treat irreversible harms with particular
care. Stone, supra note 7, at 10,797.
'50 SPS Agreement, supra note 30. The World Trade Organization is the "common
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least of the economic international community as represented in trade
negotiations. It is therefore not surprising that, on the basis of subject matter
alone, the SPS Agreement takes a radically different view of the
precautionary principle than the Bamako Convention does. Bamako seeks to
end a particular kind of trade; the SPS Agreement seeks to facilitate trade
generally. Politically, too, Bamako's sponsor, the Organization for African
Unity, is one in which the influence of the United States and Northern
economic powers is at a low ebb, while in trade negotiations it is at full flood.
The SPS Agreement is Bamako's opposite number-a forum in which one
can expect the precautionary principle to be expressed in its most limited
form.
And it is. The version of the precautionary principle embodied in the
SPS Agreement reads as follows:
[2.2.] Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary
measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific
principles, and is not maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence, except as provided [in article 5.7].
[5.7.] In cases where relevant scientific evidence is
insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent
institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members." Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994). The substantive standards for trade relations are contained in separate conventions,
most notably the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 88 and the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1145, and subsidiary agreements
like the SPS Agreement. For a very helpful overview of the precautionary principle in WTO
jurisprudence, see Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-BasedApproach
to the Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 330-63 (2002).
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information .... In such circumstances, Members shall seek
to obtain the additional information necessary for a more
objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or
phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period
of time. 5'
The trigger for application of the SPS precautionary principle is high. Article
2.2 states explicitly that the precautionary principle is the exception to the
way that health and safety measures are to be justified and maintained. In
fact, the precautionary principle is not only exceptional, it is the very negation
of a scientific basis for justifying regulatory action: measures may be based
either on science or on the precautionary principle.
5 2
Having created a hostile environment in Article 2.2, the SPS
Agreement in Article 5.7 requires some demonstration of actual uncertainty
before the precautionary principle may be relied upon. 153 The precautionary
principle only applies to "cases where relevant scientific evidence is
insufficient," which clearly necessitates thorough prior consideration of such
evidence by the would-be regulator and a finding of its insufficiency.5 4
Moreover, the regulatory measure taken shall be based on "available pertinent
information," again implying analysis before taking action. 55 These are, of
course, not necessarily unreasonable demands of a regulatory system, but they
reverse to a degree the temporal relationship between information and action
that is at the core of the precautionary principle.
The timing explicitly mandated by the SPS Agreement likewise falls
at the weak end of the spectrum. While the implied requirement for analysis
in advance of regulation does not adopt the "full scientific certainty"
language of the Rio version," 6 it comes to the same thing. It is expected that
... SPS Agreement, supra note 30, arts. 2.2, 5.7.
152 Cf. Charnovitz, supra note 82, at 280 (reporting a WTO decision that rejected an
Australian restriction which justified action based on documented uncertainty rather than
"science").
'53 SPS Agreement, supra note 30, art. 5.7.
id.
155 Id.
156 Rio Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
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the regulator will have acquired and analyzed a considerable amount of
evidence before it takes action. The provision in Article 2.2 that all measures
(whether based on the precautionary principle or "sufficient scientific
evidence") be applied "only to the extent necessary" underscores the need for
a detailed prior analysis, in that such fine tuning cannot be estimated.
Precautionary regulation cannot, in other words, take place as early under the
SPS Agreement as it can under the Bamako Convention.
The SPS Agreement restricts responses, as just noted, to those
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."'57 Similarly,
Article 3.3 requires specific, "scientific justification" of measures "which
result in a level of . . . protection" greater than mandated by other
international agreements.' The goal is to identify an optimal level of risk
and to regulate no further than that. Cost and other economic factors,
including the avoidance of undue trade restrictions, are also pertinent, either
to the determination of what is "necessary" or as additional factors to be
considered by the regulator.' Like other risk-based standards, the SPS
Agreement balances health and safety considerations against other goals.
The SPS Agreement not only limits the substance of the response, but
also the methods for determining the substance. The repeated references to
science are supplemented in Article 5.7 by the specific identification of
"objective assessment of risk" as the methodology to be used to justify the
continuation of regulatory measures. Again, in the context of contemporary
political rhetoric, it is impossible to see this as anything but a mandate for a
quantitative risk assessment, with all that it entails. 6 Given the disjunctive
157 SPS Agreement, supra note 30, art. 3.2.
158 Id. art. 3.3.
,s9 Id. art. 2.1.
,6o Gupta, Advance Informed Agreement, supra note 90, at 271 ("The scientific validity of
national health and safety measures is to be demonstrated through a formal risk
assessment."). The WTO Appellate Body in the beef hormones case took a broad view of
what is meant by risk assessment, at least where there was a bona fide divergence of opinion
within the scientific community. In such a case, the requirement for risk assessment does not
preclude a member from choosing to credit, as a precaution, a minority view. Report from
the Appellate Body, WTO Appellate Body Opinion on EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products Containing Growth Hormones, WT/DS26/ & 48/AB/R, at 194, (Jan. 16,
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treatment of science and precaution in Article 2.2, this is also potent rhetoric.
By advocating application of the precautionary principle, one is ipso facto
being unscientific. 6' The effect is exactly what a public relations firm
recommended to the Chlorine Chemistry Council-"to mobilize science
against the precautionary principle, . . . to [e]ngage a broad effort on risk
assessment within the scientific community, [and] . . . to discredit the
precautionary principle."'62 As Vanderzwaag has said, "institutional
favoritism toward scientific rationality [is a way to] weaken and narrow the
normative implications of precaution." '63
Iteration, the final element, is an explicit, integral part of the SPS
Agreement's precautionary principle. Measures based on precaution are only
"provisionally adopt[ed]."l' More important, "[m]embers shall seek to obtain
the additional information ... and review the ... measure . . . within a
reasonable period of time."' 65 This passage expressly requires iteration; it
allocates the burden of proof to the regulator, not the proponent of the activity
or technology; it is mandatory ("shall"); and it even provides a deadline.1
66
This is iteration with a vengeance, rendering all regulatory decisions that are
supported by less than complete scientific information-which is most of
1998) (Beef Hormones Case) (finding that the SPS Agreement "does not require that the risk
assessment must necessarily embody only the view of a majority of the relevant scientific
community"). For further discussion, see Geistfeld, supra note 9, at 11,332. Nevertheless,
it is clearly expected that the regulator will undertake a thorough, searching inquiry into the
relevant facts. See Bohanes, supra note 150, at 340-45 (discussing the nature of risk
assessment under Article 5.1).
161 See also KRIMSK,supra note 141, at 194 (discussing the rhetorical use of sound science);
THORNTON, supra note 66, at 410-20. Bohanes, supra note 150, at 361-63; Gupta, Advance
Informed Agreement, supra note 90, at 272-80.
62 THORNTON, supra note 66, at 344-45 (quoting the public relations firm report to the
CCC).
63 Vanderzwaag, Slippery Shores, supra note 6, at 173. Opponents of the precautionary
principle acknowledge as much, though for the reason that, in their view, such channeling is
necessary to avoid political and subjective application of the principle. E.g., Charnley &
Elliott, supra note 91, at 10,365-66.





them-unstable and subject to repeated challenge in trade tribunals. Indeed,
the SPS Agreement begs the question whether it is a bona fide version of the
precautionary principle, or whether it in effect substitutes what Wendy
Wagner has called the "unprecautionary principle," that is, permitting
regulation only where risks (or even actual harm) have been proven.'67
C. European Apotheosis: Incorporation into the Risk Paradigm
Institutionally, the European Union is divided on the precautionary
principle. The Community's charter mandates it,'68 and many of the
individual member states are politically committed to the principle, as is the
European Parliament. 69 However, the executive branch (I use the term
loosely) of the European Union, the Commission of the European
Communities, has somewhat different motivations. Its raison d 'etre being the
economic integration of Europe and the breaking down of barriers, its first
instinct is to view the world much as the WTO does. Moreover, the
Commission is a permanent bureaucracy of experts in all manner of
governmental issues, so its general worldview tends toward the technocratic,
favoring scientific methods and analysis. '70 The resulting tension between the
Commission on the one side, and some member states' governments and the
Parliament on the other, is on display in the controversy over GMOs. The
Commission, finding little traditional scientific evidence for serious concern,
has been relatively reluctant to impose severe restrictions on GMOs. 7' The
167 Wendy E. Wagner, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S.,
6 HuM. & ECOL RISK ASSESSMENT 459, 466-68 (2000).
168 Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 51, art. 174.
1
69 See Boutillon, supra note 4, at 464-68.
170 PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 53,'57 (2d
ed. 1998).
171 See Applegate, Prometheus Principle, supra note 12, at 228; Stephen Tromans, Promise,
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governments and Parliament, on the other hand, have insisted on extremely
restrictive measures, and they have by and large prevailed. 1
72
The GMO debate is highly relevant to our current concerns. GMOs
were surely the gorilla in the closet (together with beef hormones and "mad
cow disease") when the Commission described its position on the
precautionary principle in the Communication from the Commission on the
Precautionary Principle in 2000. The Commission regards the precautionary
principle as a "full-fledged and general principle of international law."'
7 3
Interpreting it, however, the Commission steers a careful course between
adoption of a limited version of the principle in accordance with its own
predilections and an expansive version that would be acceptable to member
governments and Parliament. 7a In so doing, the Commission manufactures
a version of the precautionary principle that is a compromise of the different
visions we have seen. And precisely because it is a compromise that seeks to
elucidate a general principle of international law, the Commission
Communication demonstrates how much the precautionary principle has
changed.
First, the Communication offers a restatement of the principle:
When there are reasonable grounds for concern that potential
hazards may affect the environment or human, animal or plant
health, and when at the same time the available data preclude
a detailed risk evaluation, the precautionary principle has
Peril, Precaution: The EnvironmentalRegulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 187, 195-99 (2001).
172 Tromans, supra note 171, at 195-99.
171 Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 11.
7aThe Canadian government recently adopted its own, unofficial position on the
precautionary principle. Canadian societyhas some similar tensions on environmental issues,
and the government statement parallels the Commission's very closely. GOVERNMENT OF
CANADA, A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH/PRINCIPLE:
PROPOSED GUIDING PRINCIPLES (2001).
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been politically accepted as a risk management strategy in
several fields.'
This is in many ways an unremarkable-if lukewarm-version of the
precautionary principle, with the exception of the remark that the
precautionary principle has been "politically accepted as a risk management
strategy."' 76 Like the SPS Agreement, this statement deliberately relegates the
precautionary principle to a rhetorical netherworld of non-science. The
primary emphasis of the Communication, however, is a set of six guidelines
for implementation. Regulatory measures taken pursuant to the precautionary
principle are to be:
* proportional to the level of protection;
" nondiscriminatory in application;
* consistent with similar measures;
* based on examination of potential benefits and costs;
" subject to review in light of new scientific data;
* capable of assigning responsibility for producing
scientific evidence.177
The Communication also addresses explicitly the "factors triggering recourse
to the precautionary principle" and the "measures resulting from reliance" on
it. 178
To channel reliance on the precautionary principle, the Commission
carefully defines what triggers its application. The general statement quoted
above requires "reasonable grounds for concern.'1 ' The Communication
also requires specific identification of the adverse effects, the goal being to
establish a "less theoretical and more concrete perception [i.e., in the sense
'71 Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 8.
176 Id. (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 3.
'7 See id. at 15-16.
179 Id. at 8.
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of understanding] of the risk."' ° Note in particular the use of the term risk:
the Commission is not in fact limiting this preliminary investigation to the
identification of effects, but rather expects at least a preliminary evaluation
of their seriousness and likelihood, the two components of risk. This is
confirmed by the insistence that identifying the adverse effects can only occur
as the result of "[a] scientific evaluation ... based on the available data,"
which includes factors like severity, probability ("possibility ofoccurrence"),
and irreversibility.'' Indeed, the Commission regards the initial investigation
as encompassing all four basic elements of risk assessment. 8 2 The
Commission also treats the demonstrated existence of scientific uncertainty
as a specific prerequisite for application of the precautionary principle." 3 As
with the SPS Agreement, one cannot demonstrate uncertainty without a
thorough analysis of what is known-and this is exactly what the
Commission has in mind.
The Commission's parameters for the timing element, as in the SPS
Agreement, are heavily influenced by the trigger. Precipitant, ad hoc
responses are in effect ruled out by the investigatory requirements of the
trigger, such that regulatory action can only come later in the timeline
between the earliest hints of an adverse effect and full characterization of the
relationship between the cause and effect according to scientific methods. In
addition, the Commission explicitly addresses the command point that most
other versions leave unstated, and it takes a conservative position on it. Of the
three timing positions that Wiener describes, the Commission takes the
weakest, that uncertainty does notjustify inaction. 84 This is the same position
adopted by the otherwise inexplicably awkward language of the Rio
Declaration ("shall not be used as a reason for postponing")."5 Uncertainty,
standing alone, does not justify regulatory action, and it certainly does not
require it.
IS0 Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 13.
I81 d.
182 The elements are hazard identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment,
and risk characterization. Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 13.
.3 Id. at 13-14.
4 See Wiener, supra note 19, at 1514-15.
B5 Rio Declaration, supra note 1, princ. 15.
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The Commission Communication specifies several important
characteristics of appropriate responses. First, there is no limitation on the
types of measures that can constitute appropriate responses. Bans, phase-outs,
embargoes, and the like are not at all required, even when the precautionary
principle is properly invoked. Indeed, "[t]he decision to do nothing may be
a response in its own right."' 86 Second, this flexibility must be used to assure
that responses are proportional to the chosen level of protection. 7
Proportionality appears to have two aspects. One is a reasonable relationship
between the seriousness of the risk presented and the measures adopted to
reduce it to an acceptable level. Draconian responses to minor risks are not
permitted. The other is the eschewing of a regulatory goal of zero risk. In this
respect, among others, the Commission version of the precautionary principle
explicitly embodies the risk paradigm.
Third, in achieving a proportionate response, the regulator must
consider factors well beyond simple hazard. As we have seen, the analysis
begins with the more complex concept of risk (hazard x exposure), but it also
embraces the benefits and costs of both action and the status quo. 88 It adopts
the European trade principles of nondiscrimination, consistency with similar
measures, 189 and consideration of less restrictive alternatives. 90 The principle
is also not to be used as a "disguised form of protectionism."',' From this
perspective, the Commission's repeated reminders that the precautionary
principle is part of risk management, and not assessment, emphasize that
precaution is but one policy among many that risk managers apply in reaching
risk decisions. Fourth, the consistency requirement has a function similar to
the proportionality requirement, not in the sense of achieving a uniform
acceptable risk level across all regulated activities (food, drinking water,
driving, air pollution, etc.), but rather in restraining a regulator from using
uncertainty as such to justify regulatory action. Instead, the regulator should
156 Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 15.
187 Id. at 17-18.
... Id. at 18-19.
189 Id.
'9°Id. at 17.
"9' id. at 2.
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follow comparable regulatory measures, rather than adopt excessively
stringent ones.
92
Fifth, the Commission specifically embraces the technocratic
methodologies of risk assessment and "economic cost/benefit analysis" as the
preferred ways to choose responses. 193 Finally, the Commission cautions that,
while members have great flexibility in choosing responses, they may be
subject to judicial review to ensure that they are not arbitrary.194
The last element of the precautionary principle, iteration, is also an
explicit part of the Commission's version. 9 The Commission addresses both
aspects of iteration. First, it declares that all measures relying on the
precautionary principle are subject to reevaluation in the light of new
information, which is the logical corollary of the uncertainty prerequisite.
Once the uncertainty is removed, the precautionary principle no longer
applies, and regulation based on it should be modified or abolished to reflect
what is known with reasonable certainty. The parallel to the SPS
Agreement is obvious, and the Communication in fact makes specific
reference to it. However, the Commission Communication-consistent with
its general compromise position--carefully distinguishes itself from the SPS
position. 97 The Commission Communication notes that different sectors of
regulation may require different treatment; one precautionary principle does
not necessarily fit all situations. In particular, the Commission rejects an
arbitrary deadline within which precaution-based regulations must be
abolished or modified. The appropriate time "is linked to the development of
scientific knowledge rather than to a time factor," though excessive delays are
not to be tolerated. 98 Second, the Communication rejects the clear allocation
192 To use the GMO example, which the Commission may or may not have had in mind,
residual uncertainty about GMOs does not justify a total ban. Rather, the regulator should
look for guidance from, for example, existing food safety standards.
" Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 17, 20.
194 See id. at 15.
9 See id. at 19-20.
'"Id. at 19.
1"I Id. at 19-20.
'" See Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 19-20.
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of the burden of proof to the regulator.' 99 It takes the middle ground position
that the precautionary principle as such does not determine burden of proof.
Rather, the burden of proof depends on the relevant preexisting regulatory
structure. Drugs, for example, require preapproval, and the burden is on the
manufacturer. Where no prior approval system applies, the burden is on the
challenger to demonstrate the need for regulation. °°
The overall, and explicit, thrust of the Communication is to fit the
precautionary principle into the risk paradigm, rather than to offer it as an
alternative to the risk paradigm, as many supporters of a strong precautionary
principle would have it.2 1' The Communication emphasizes repeatedly that
the precautionary principle is a rule of risk management and not of risk
assessment.2 2 This move places the precautionary principle not only within
the risk paradigm, but within one of the risk paradigm's preferred
methodologies. At a technical level, compartmentalizing the precautionary
principle in risk management prevents its application to the fact-gathering
assessment phase, to which supporters of a strong version have sometimes
applied it.2"3 By keeping the precautionary principle out of risk assessment,
the Commission Communication also signals its commitment to the
traditional scientific basis of the risk paradigm. Throughout, regulatory
decisions are legitimated by technical knowledge and the market, features of
the risk paradigm.
'99 Id. at 20.200 Id. at 20-2 1.
201 Compare THORNTON, supra note 66, at 346-49 (advocating fundamental change); Hey,
Precautionary Concept, supra note 122, at 305, with Charnley & Elliott, supra note 91, at
10,363-65 (criticizing the substitution of the precautionary principle for risk assessment). Cf.
Rena 1. Steinzor, "You Just Don't Understand"- The Right and Left Conversation, 32 Envtl.
L. Rep., Envtl. L. Inst. 11,109-11,112-13 (2002) ("The left views risk assessment as
consistent with the precautionary principle. In operation, risk assessment must appropriately
serve as a device for organizing the information that is then subject to the precautionary
principle.").
202 E.g., Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 8, 9, 12.
203 DOUGLAS CRAWFORD-BROWN, RISK-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS: METHODS AND
CULTURE 126-27 (1999) (reporting a strong version of the precautionary principle that
"whenever uncertainty exists about a risk, decisions should be based on the estimate of risk
that is likely to lead to the greatest protection of health").
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The Commission's compromise version of the precautionary principle
tilts decisively in the direction of the risk paradigm and away from the hazard
paradigm, and so toward the more recent, weaker versions of the
precautionary principle and away from the earlier, stronger versions.3 While
this undoubtedly reflects to some degree the predilections of an institution
like the Commission, it more importantly reflects the taming of the
precautionary principle generally.
To gauge the extent of this tilt, it is interesting to compare the
Commission position with that of the United States, which has sought to limit
the scope and force of the precautionary principle at every opportunity.05 The
United States critique is encapsulated in a recent speech by John Graham,
director of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of
Management and Budget.20 6 Nearly all of his main concerns are shared by the
Commission's Communication, as are most of his proposed remedies.
Graham regards the precautionary principle as subjective and subject to
abuse; it therefore requires scientific and procedural safeguards. The
Communication recognizes the concern, particularly as it relates to trade, and
so it hedges the precautionary principle around with threshold requirements
and limitations on responses. It also, as we have seen, places the principle
firmly within a risk-based decision making process. Graham believes that
regulatory action should be preceded by full scientific and cost-benefit
analyses of existing information; the Communication delivers precisely that.
Graham urges acceptance of a wide range of precautionary responses; the
Communication does him one better and expressly recognizes that non-action
2o" The extent of this tilt will have to be reevaluated when the European Court of Justice rules
on appeals from a pair of recent decisions by the Court of First Instance, Pfizer Annual
Health SA v. Council of the European Union, Case T-13/99 (11 Sept. 2002), and A lpharma
Inc. v. Council of the European Union, Case T-70/99 (11 Sept. 2002). Both cases upheld
Council and Commission action to restrict certain antibiotics in animal feed, contrary to the
recommendation of the Commission's science advisory committee, and based on the
precautionary principle.
.0s Peter H. Sand, The Precautionary Principle: A European Perspective, 6 HuM. & ECOL
RISK ASSESSMENT 445, 447 (2000).
2"6 Graham, supra note 7.
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may be appropriate response in some circumstances. The "general principle
of international law" offered by the Commission is, indeed, a tame one.
D. A Note on the Cartagena Protocol
The same evolution can be seen in the Cartagena Protocol to the
Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD"), signed in 2000.207 The
centerpiece of the Cartagena Protocol is prior informed consent ("PIC"),
which requires an exporting state to inform the importing state, fully and in
advance of shipment, of the nature and hazards of the product in question.
Only certain classes of GMOs (or "living modified organisms," in
Cartagena's parlance) are covered by the PIC (or "advance informed
consent," in Cartagena's parlance) procedure.20 8 For covered GMOs, the teeth
of the Cartagena Protocol are in the importing country's ability to refuse
consent to importation, and that is where the precautionary principle comes
in. The Cartagena Protocol as a whole was a remarkably successful
compromise. It was signed by 103 countries and supported by both sides of
the rancorous GMO debate.2" The price of widespread acceptance by
supporters of GM crops, however, was high.
To prevent PIC from becoming an excuse for discrimination or trade
protectionism (sound familiar?),2"0 the Cartagena Protocol describes in detail
the permissible grounds for refusing consent. Like the SPS Agreement and
the Commission Communication, it "takes as its starting point a risk
assessment rather than the much feared nonscientific criteria for decision
207 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 42. The CBD was adopted at the Earth Summit in
1992. The United States has signed but not ratified the CBD, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2001).
201 Cartagena Protocol, supra note 2, arts. 7-10.
209 The United States, because it has not ratified the underlying Convention on Biological
Diversity, is not eligible to sign or ratify the Biosafety Protocol. Nevertheless, as the world's
largest producer of GMOs, the United States took a leading role in the negotiations and
supported the outcome. See Gupta, Governing Trade, supra note 52, at 26.210 See Holly Saigo, Note, Agricultural Biotechnology and the Negotiation of the Biosafety
Protocol, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. Rev. 779, 811 (2000).
2002]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
making."2  The decision to refuse consent "shall be in accordance with
Article 1 5, '212 and Article 15 (entitled "Risk Assessment") requires that risk
assessments "undertaken pursuant to this Protocol shall be carried out in a
scientifically sound manner, in accordance with Annex Ill and taking into
account recognized risk assessment techniques. "213 Annex III sets out detailed
protocols for such risk assessments. It is hard to imagine a stronger
endorsement of the risk paradigm.
If the risk assessment shows an unacceptable level of risk, then the
importing state may refuse entry, of course. If the risk assessment is
inconclusive, however, the importer may nevertheless withhold consent,
based on the Cartagena version of the precautionary principle:
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant
scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of
the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in
the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human
health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as
appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified
organism in question. . . in order to avoid or minimize such
potential adverse effects.2"4
Again, like the Commission Communication, this version envisions primarily
a technical decision: "relevant scientific information and knowledge" must
refer, in light of Articles 10 and 15, to traditional risk assessments. The
Cartagena Protocol is in fact indistinguishable from the SPS Agreement in
211 Gupta, Governing Trade, supra note 52, at 30; see also Gupta, Advance Informed
Agreement, supra note 90, at 272-80 (describing role of science in Cartagena Protocol).
212 Cartagena Protocol, supra note 2, art. 10(1) (emphasis added). See also id. art. 15(2)
(mirroring art. 10).
213 Id. art. 15(1).
214 Id. art. 10(6). A parallel provision appears in Article 11(8).
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this respect,215 though it maintains a studied ambiguity about the exact
relationship between the protocol and SPS.
216
Turning to the elements, the Cartagena Protocol imposes a definite,
science-based trigger. For timing, uncertainty "shall not prevent"-but does
not require-a decision to ban importation. The response, on the other hand,
is firm (refusing consent to import), though this is less a statement of
principle than an artifact of the PIC procedure. Moreover, there is no
restriction on conditioning consent,217 which permits considerable flexibility
in offering a response. Finally, Cartagena takes iteration to new heights by
allowing thirdparties-including private parties-to request a state of import
to review a decision to refuse consent.2 8 The importing state must respond
in writing, giving reasons, within ninety days2 9-far shorter than even the
SPS Agreement allows.
The striking feature of the weak precautionary principle in the
Cartagena Protocol is the huge unpopularity of GMOs in the international
community generally. Subject matter usually has a strong influence on the
content of the precautionary principle, as we have seen. If the importation of
hazardous waste is a pariah in the South, GMOs are pariahs in both North
and South. For example, Austria and France illegally continue to refuse
importation of GMOs, and the President of Zambia has made news recently
by rejecting genetically modified corn even to feed starving people because
"there is no conclusive evidence that [GM corn] is safe."22 Moreover,
opposition to GMOs is almost entirely based on the hazard paradigm,
215 See Chamovitz, supra note 82, at 298-301.
The preamble to the Cartagena Protocol delivers deliberately conflicting messages. Gupta,
Governing Trade, supra note 52, at 30-31.
217 Cartagena Protocol, supra note 2, art. 10(3)(a).
218 Cartagena Protocol Article 12(2) allows the "[plarty of export or a notifier" to make a
request for reconsideration. Under Article 8, an exporter may make notifications, and under
article 3(d) an "exporter" includes "any legal or natural person."
29 Cartagena Protocol, supra note 2, art. 12(3).
220 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) Update No. 25, supra note 93. Zambia's action must be
regarded as extreme, or worse. It is hard to imagine how one could ever justify permitting
starvation on the basis of the very uncertain risks that GMOs pose.
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regarding GMOs as dangerous in themselves."' And yet the version of the
precautionary principle that emerged from Cartagena is firmly in the risk
camp, even extending some features of the SPS Agreement model. This, too,
is a measure of the extent to which the precautionary principle has been
tamed.
I. ACQUIESCENCE OF JOHANNESBURG
The recently completed World Summit on Sustainable Development
in Johannesburg had little to say about the precautionary principle. The goal
of the Johannesburg Summit was to revitalize-or, more accurately,
reorient-the concept of sustainable development to focus on the situation of
developing nations and the growing gap between North and South.222 In this
broad landscape, where basic sanitation, famine, and extreme poverty are the
dominant features, the precautionary principle does not readily catch the eye.
Moreover, the focus of the WSSD was implementation of the existirig Rio
framework, not renegotiation of its terms. As a result, the precautionary
principle was not a focus of the Johannesburg meetings. However, it did not
22 In a previous article, I described this phenomenon in detail, though in somewhat different
terms. Applegate, Prometheus Principle, supra note 12, at 211-22 (describing the
"Frankenstein narrative").
222 The Johannesburg Declaration firmly redirects sustainable development in the direction
of development rather than sustainability. This process began with the Rio Declaration in
1992, but more slowly and subtly. John S. Applegate & Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Introduction:
Syncopated Sustainable Development, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-4 (2001)
(describing sustainable development as syncopated, with the emphasis on the second beat);
Lakshman D. Guruswamy, International Environmental Law: Boundaries, Landmarks, and
Realities, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 43, 45. The Johannesburg Declaration
affirmed this change in paragraph 8, describing Rio as setting a "new agenda for sustainable
development." Johannesburg went further in Article 5 and identified three "pillars of
sustainable development-economic development, social development and environmental
protection," formally relegating "sustainable" to minority partnership in sustainable
development. Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, Res. 1, Annex, 5,
8, at 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20, U.N. Sales No. E.03.II.A.l (2002), http://www.
johanenesburg.org/ html/documents/summitdocs/131302_wssd report reissued.pdf (last
visited Jan. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Johannesburg Declaration].
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entirely escape the attention of the conference, and what it had to say about
the principle is noteworthy.
A. Precaution at Johannesburg
Though the Johannesburg Declaration neither identifies nor refers to
the precautionary principle, the companion Plan of Implementation mentions
it twice.223 The references in the Implementation Plan place the precautionary
principle firmly in the science paradigm, much in the way that the
Commission Communication does. Paragraph 22 adjures states to,
[aim] to achieve, by 2020, the use and production of
chemicals in ways that lead to the minimization of significant
adverse effects on human health and the environment, using
transparent science-based risk assessment procedures and
science-based management procedures, taking into account
the precautionary approach, as set out in principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development .... 224
Paragraph 109(f) similarly urges states to "[p]romote and improve
science-based decision-making and reaffirm the precautionary approach as
set out in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development." '225 By compartmentalizing the precautionary principle within
"science-based risk management,"226 the Summit tacitly acquiesced in the
redefinition of the precautionary principle that this article has traced. At the
very least, the Summit missed an opportunity to assess the steady erosion of
223 All WSSD documents are available at www.johannesburgsunmit.org. The references in
the Plan of Implementation are IM 23 and 109(f). The precautionary principle was mentioned
in a number of the preparatory meetings, but only in passing. There was no suggestion that
the precautionary principle would or should be a significant topic for consideration at the
WSSD.
224 Plan of Implementation, supra note 2, 23, at 19.
221 Id. at 109(f).
226 Whatever value "minimizing" may have in 23, it is largely taken away by the
qualification to "significant adverse effects." The two ideas are inconsistent. Id.
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the precautionary principle and to reassert the core values that the principle
was designed to vindicate. If instead the conference had acknowledged the
change in the precautionary principle, it could have catalyzed discussion of
its wisdom and desirability. Should the precautionary principle be strong or
weak? Should it emphasize aggressive protection against unknown,
unforeseen harms, or should it be a predictable standard that facilitates
compliance by economic entities? Without a new consensus, the core
functions of the precautionary principle will be lost, and it, like the toy
poodle, will be domesticated to the point that its wild ancestors would not
recognize it as kin.
B. Core Values
If the international community accepts the changes in the
precautionary principle as being for the better, it still makes sense to attempt
to reach agreement on a new consensus position that stabilizes and reaffirms
the principle as currently understood. Even a minimalist precautionary
principle forms a bulwark against what Professor Wagner calls
"unprecaution," that is, permitting new technologies to go forward, unabated
and uncontrolled, until their harms are clearly demonstrated.227 Even a
minimalist precautionary principle can help to protect the core values
described at the beginning of the article: minimizing harm and acting despite
uncertainty.
1. Minimizing Harm
The precautionary principle seeks to avoid harm to human health and
the environment wherever the opportunity to do so presents itself. Confronted
with the choice, regulators should take the action that best assures that harm
will be prevented. This seems a mere truism, but in fact it represents a
fundamental choice, and that choice is exemplified by the ongoing efforts by
economic entities in the United States to remake American environmental
law. Taken as a whole, United States environmental law rejects economic
227 Wagner, Chemical Regulation, supra note 167, at 466-68.
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efficiency as the sole, or even presumptive, measure of environmental
protection. However, the same interests that challenge the precautionary
principle have tried to impose a "supermandate" on all environmental, safety,
and health regulation (but not on other forms of governmental action), which
would subject it not only to cost-benefit analysis, but substantively require all
regulations' calculated benefits to outweigh their calculated costs.2 '
A detailed analysis of regulatory standards by Sidney Shapiro and
Robert Glicksman reveals that only a few federal statutes even adopt cost-
benefit analysis as an analytical test and almost.2 9 none are governed by a
requirement that benefits outweigh costs.2 30 If there is a single theme that
undergirds American environmental, health, and safety statutes, it is, as
Thomas McGarity observed of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA"), "' [i]fwe cannot have a perfectly clean workplace
and environment, then we shall do the best that we can."' 2 31 Where it is
"feasible" or technologically possible to avoid injuries, they are to be
avoided; where it is not, technology must improve. Furthermore,
environmental harm is not to be reduced to a technocratic calculation. In
rejecting an effort to do just that, so as to "[promote] a rational allocation of
society's assets," the D.C. Circuit observed:
This is nothing more or less than cost-benefit analysis:
Interior's rule attempts to optimize social welfare by restoring
228 This legislation is described in Celia Campbell-Mohn & John S. Applegate, Learningfrom
NEPA: Guidelines for Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 93, 137-38,
and is advocated in Calandrillo, supra note 135, at 1013-16.
229 The exception is a particularly obscure portion of the Safe Drinking Water Act, which
permits EPA to override the general feasibility analysis with cost-benefit analysis. See 42
U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(6)(A) (2000). It seems apparent that Congress and the supporters of this
measure sought to hide this departure from the general minimization mandate.
230 SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 128, at 31-45. President Reagan's Executive Order
No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (since replaced by President Clinton's No. 12,866,
58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993)) instructed agencies to regulate only where benefits outweighed
costs, but of course it had no authority to overturn statutory standards.
23 Thomas 0. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies
for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46(3) LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 199
(Summer 1983) (quoting Indiana Senator Birch Bayh on the 1972 Clean Water Act).
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an injured resource only when the diminution in the
resource's value to society is greater in magnitude than the
cost of restoring it... The fatal flaw of Interior's approach,
however, is that it assumes that natural resources are fungible
goods, just like any other, and that the value to society
generated by a particular resource can be accurately measured
in every case-assumptions that Congress apparently rejected.
[Congress'] repeated emphasis on the primacy of
restoration rejected the underlying premise of Interior's rule,
which is that restoration is wasteful if its cost exceeds-by
even the slightest amount-the diminution in use value of the
injured resource.232
Fundamentally, as the court recognized, the requirement to minimize
environmental harm is a statement about values, not efficiency. Demonstrably
perverse effects aside, even expensively or inefficiently avoided deaths and
injuries are avoided deaths and injuries.
Minimizing harm also means assessing, and taking regulatory action,
when indicated, in advance of harm occurring. The precautionary principle
offers an opportunity to ask hard questions of new technologies. In the words
of one advocate, it is a "speedbump"'233 that requires potential hazards to be
studied and alternatives developed with an eye toward finding ways to
prevent the harm altogether.234 The information demands could be brief or
extensive, standardized or ad hoc, depending on the setting. United States
food and drug and pesticide laws insist on fairly rigorous proof of safety in
advance of permission to distribute. Industrial chemicals, on the other hand,
are subject to far weaker pre-market review,235 resulting in extremely
... Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 456-57 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
233 Joel A. Tickner, A Map Toward Precautionary Decision Making, in PROTECTING PUBU1C
HEALTH, supra note 12, at 163-64.
234 E.g., The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic, Sept. 16,
1993, princ. 8, 1993 WL 645202 [hereinafter Nuuk Declaration].
235 Wagner, Chemical Regulation, supra note 167, at 466-68.
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inconsistent and generally inadequate amounts of information to support any
kind of assessment of risk.236
The United States National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")
offers a practical example of prior assessment.237 Substantively, NEPA
requires the consideration of environmental effects in decision making, and
it establishes several national policies that are consistent with the
precautionary principle: protection of future generations, avoidance of
"undesirable and unintended consequences" of human activities, and long-
term sustainability of resources.238 Procedurally, NEPA requires the
preparation of detailed environmental impact statements that must take a hard
look at the foreseeable consequences of the federal action.239 Whether or not
dire consequences are known or expected, both NEPA and the precautionary
principle require the development of information about activities that might
affect the environment before the activity can go forward. NEPA takes the
view, also consistent with the precautionary principle, that it is better to delay
action at the stage where harm can be anticipated and avoided or at least
mitigated, than to attempt corrective action afterward.24 It is not coincidental
that both are triggered by serious or irreversible actions. Finally, NEPA offers
invaluable experience with the question of how much information is enough
before an activity can proceed.24" '
Minimizing environmental harm, and specifically minimizing
environmental harm by taking anticipatory regulatory action to avoid or
mitigate it, is a core value of the precautionary principle. It is also a core
236 David Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed Facts, 32 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,232, 10,237 (2002) (describing basic testing batteries).
237 See Campbell-Mohn & Applegate, supra note 228, at 125-34; SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN,
supra note 128, at 122-27; Dinah Shelton, The Impact of Scientific Uncertainty on
Environmental Law and Policy in the United States, in THE CHALLENGE OF
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 4, at 214-18.
238 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2000).
,,9 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000); Calvert Cliffs Coord. Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971).240 See Greene County Planning Bd. v. Board of Comn'rs, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972).
24" Campbell-Mohn & Applegate, supra note 228, at 133; Carla Mattix & Kathleen Becker,
Scientific Uncertainty under the National Environmental Policy Act, 54 ADMIN. L. REv.
1125, 1131 (2002); Shelton, supra note 237, at 214-18.
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value of United States environmental law. Just as these values are under
regular assault in the United States by economic interests, they are under
regular assault in international fora. Even a limited precautionary principle
would help to maintain the fundamental commitment to minimizing harm.
2. Acting Despite Uncertainty
The other core function of the precautionary principle might be
characterized as negative: it is a bulwark against the reestablishment of the
"unprecautionary principle" that dominated environmental law before the
environmental decade from 1970 to 1980. Instead of taking early action to
prevent harm, the unprecautionary principle demands a body count, as it
were, before preventive action can be justified. Turning again to the United
States for examples, regulatory decisions under uncertainty face an
increasingly hostile Congress and federal judiciary. At the height of the
environmental decade, the D.C. Circuit spoke of the "familiar choice" faced
by a regulatory agency:
On one hand, it could regulate a substance whose properties
were incompletely understood (less chlorinated PCBs) by
relying, in major part, upon its knowledge about more
familiar substances (more chlorinated PCBs), despite the
uncertainties of extrapolation from one substance to another.
On the other hand, it could delay regulation until science
could more fully explore the risks of the new substance.242
The court strongly affirmed the agency's choice of the former tack.
43
Likewise, the decision to protect the ozone layer by severely restricting
ozone-depleting substances was a truly precautionary choice. At the time of
242 Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
243 Id. at 89. See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 2, 17, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en
banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (The Clean Air Act is to be "precautionary in
nature," so the court will not "demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect." Such
proof may be possible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of the statute is to be served.).
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EPA's initial regulations, the thinning of stratospheric ozone was an
unobserved hypothesis. Only after the new standards were established did
further investigation permit actual observation of the "ozone hole" over the
Antarctic.2 In both of these examples, uncertainty was not regarded as a
legitimate reason for withholding regulatory action.
This commitment, too, is under assault in the United States and
around world. Federal courts have become increasingly aggressive in
independently evaluating the scientific basis of agency decisions. Ifcases like
Gulf South (reversing an agency decision that the court found was not based
on "good science") and Corrosion Proof Fittings (rejecting what the court
regarded as insufficiently detailed agency findings) are not yet the norm, there
is talk of"Daubert-izing" agency review, that is, treating judges as scientific
gatekeepers for agencies in the way that they are for civil juries.245 In other
cases, courts have set themselves up as arbiters of what constitutes the "best
available evidence. 246 Congress has periodically supported legislation that
would hold agencies to high standards of proof-mainly in terms of large
amounts of risk and cost information-tojustify regulation,247 and the second
Bush administration has markedly increased the role of the economists at the
Office of Information and Regulatory Policy ("OIRA") in reviewing the basis
of agency regulations before promulgation. 4 At the international level, the
WTO repeatedly (and with legal justification, as we have seen) demands
scientific justification for environmental protection measures and demands
their removal when its tribunals find them wanting.249 In unprecautionary
2David Hurlbut, Beyond the Montreal Protocol: Impact on Nonparty States and Lessons
for Future Environmental Protection Regimes, 4 COLO. J. INT'LENVTL. L. & POL'Y 344,351
n.21 (1993).
245 See Wendy E. Wagner, "Bad Science" Fiction: The Imaginary Crisis in Public Health
and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
n.25, on file with author) (collecting examples and criticizing this development).
24 See Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
247 Campbell-Mohn & Applegate, supra note 228, at 106-07; Calandrillo, supra note 135, at
966.
248 Rena Steinzor, "You Just Don't Understand": The Left and Right in Conversation, 32
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,109, 11,109 n.4 (2002).
249 For a critical overview of the WTO cases, see Lakshman D. Guruswamy, The Promise of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): Justice in Trade and
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fora, lack of full certainty is not just an excuse for doing nothing; it is a
mandate for doing nothing.
A stable precautionary principle would resist further erosion of
regulators' ability to act despite uncertainty by firmly rejecting the arguments,
increasingly put forward, that a regulator needs full or nearly full information
before acting. In a recent article, Gail Charnley and Donald Elliott make the
remarkable assertion that the precautionary principle "challeng[es] a core
premise of the American legal culture that requires an extensive factual
record to justify government regulatory action."25 Chamley and Elliott
choose their words carefully. That an extensive record is a core premise of
United States law is highly questionable,2"' but it is certain that economic
interests would like to make that the case, and they have had some notable
successes.252 The adequacy of supporting information will always be
debatable at the margin-the precautionary principle is no more vague than
"arbitrary, capricious" in this regard-but its statement of a general goal
or approach will guide regulators and tribunals in those marginal cases.
Just as "substantial evidence" imparts a "mood" of skepticism in evaluating
agency action, 53 the precautionary principle imparts a mood of caution in
Environmental Disputes, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189, 197-206 (1998). For a more complete (and
more recent) overview, see STEVE CHARNOVITZ, TRADE LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
(2002).
250 Charnley & Elliott, supra note 91, at 10,364.
251 See, e.g., Steinzor, supra note 248, at 11,111-12. For example, the D.C. Circuit had this
to say about the Clean Air Act as recently as this year:
As we discussed earlier, however, EPA has no obligation either to identify
an accurate "safe level" of a pollutant or to quantify precisely the
pollutant's risks prior to setting primary NAAQS. Rather, EPA must err
on the side of caution, just as it did here-setting the NAAQS at whatever
level it deems necessary and sufficient to protect the public health with an
adequate margin of safety, taking into account both the available evidence
and the inevitable scientific uncertainties.
Am. Trucking Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 378.
252 Cases like EDF v. EPA and Ethyl are old. The post-Reagan judiciary has produced cases
like Corrosion Proof and Chlorine Chemistry. On the other hand, most United States statutes
are distinctly precautionary, though not uncompromisingly so. Applegate, Precautionary
Preference, supra note 12, at 420-39.
253 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.); see also
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embracing new technologies, protecting the real core premise of American
environmental culture.
The precautionary principle would, in other words, be a bulwark
against what Hornstein has called "super synopticism," the demand for more
and more information to justify regulation. Super synopticism has a certain
appeal because it is the logical extension of a system based on science. But
the demand for ever more information can be and has been used to insulate
activities from regulation.255 One of the great challenges for an information-
based regulatory system is paralysis by analysis, the investment of so much
effort in determining the need for and nature of regulatory intervention that
no action is taken. This danger has, in fact, been exploited in numerous
efforts to "reform" regulation in ways that would require massive
expenditures of time and resources in providing an exacting basis for
decisions.256 The precautionary principle does not reject science or tools like
risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. Rather, it recognizes that the need
for early detection and action is greater than the need for definition and
quantification.257 A precautionary principle that expressly permits regulation
while a significant amount of uncertainty remains is, therefore, an important
bulwark against endless demands for more information. As Geistfeld puts it,
the precautionary principle stands for the proposition that lack of information
should not disadvantage the potential victim.258
Whatever gross inefficiencies or perverse countervailing risks might
be feared from such an approach can be remedied, within the terms of the
precautionary principle, by the requirement of iteration. The iteration
requirement makes early precautionary action more palatable and indeed
Freestone & Hey, supra note 17, at 264 ("attitude of mind").
254 Hornstein, Lessons, supra note 128, at 387.
25 Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400-10. NEPA or NEPA-like requirements can be used in the same way,
of course, to achieve opposite results. The practice under NEPA is therefore particularly
valuable, because it seeks a balance between action and information.
256 Campbell-Mohn & Applegate, supra note 228, at 121-23.
257 See Santillo et al., supra note 66, at 45-46.
25 Geistfeld, supra note 9, at 11,330-31.
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more sensible.259 As Christopher Shroeder explains, "[s]o long as precise
information on risks and their effects remains unavailable or available only
at substantial expense (in terms of both cost and regulatory delay),
prophylactic rules will continue to be important regulatory tools, though the
appropriate precision and detail of such rules for risks need further
elucidation."2" Shapiro and Glicksman take this observation a step further
and advocate a regulatory system built on initial, broadly precautionary
action, to be followed by "back end adjustments"--deadline extensions,
waivers, prosecutorial discretion, periodic review (i.e., iteration), etc.-as
necessary.26' Iteration allows regulators to take aggressively protective
positions initially in the face of uncertainty, but to pull back when greater
certainty yields greater confidence in our understanding of the nature and
extent of the risk. The D.C. Circuit recently held that uncertainty was "an
eminently rational reason to set the primary standard at a somewhat higher
level, at least until additional studies became available. ' '262 The National
259 Compare Steinzor, supra note 248, at 11,110, with Charnley & Elliott, supra note 91, at
10,363 (both approving generally an iterative system). Take the example of saccharine. It
was initially banned because it was found to cause cancer in rodents. This is precautionary:
rodents are not humans (so it is less than full certainty), but rodents are reasonably good
predictors of other mammalian systems. The Congressional reaction, too, is a good example
of the precautionary principle at work. Congress moderated the initial reaction (a ban) to
require only labeling, but it also commissioned new research. Presumably, the saccharine
industry also commissioned its own research. And when that research demonstrated that
saccharine is apparently not a human carcinogen (though confirmed that it is a rodent
carcinogen), the restrictions were lifted. This is exactly the course of events that an iterative
precautionary approach to toxic substances anticipates. The whole process was longer and
more convoluted than this precis suggests, but it shows caution being replaced by acceptance
after a more thorough investigation. See APPLEGATE ETAL., supra note 65, at 390. Following
the publication of the new National Toxicology Program position on saccharine, Congress
repealed the saccharine labeling and study requirements at 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(o) and 343a.
The name of the new legislation is a mouthful-Saccharin Warning Elimination via
Environmental Testing Employing Science and Technology Act-but its acronym is
positively saccharine: the SWEETEST Act (Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 518 (2000)).260 Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 495, 558 (1986).
26' SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 128, at 158-76.
262 Am. Trucking Ass'n, 283 F.3d at 379.
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Academy of Sciences recommends this approach to conservative default
assumptions in risk assessment.263
From this perspective, the requirement for iteration is a real strength
of the precautionary principle, allowing it to fill "the silent interim" between
initial concern and scientific certainty.264 By providing a mechanism for
regularly revisiting regulatory decisions, the precautionary principle permits
early regulation in the absence of complete information because it can take
another look later. It thus permits both regulation at the point when it will do
most good, and correction when the initial restrictions seem too strict (or too
lenient). The unprecautionary alternative, awaiting comprehensive analysis,
will often mean that regulation will be imposed after it is too late, for
individuals or for the earth.265
The Johannesburg Summit should have debated, not acquiesced in,
the erosion of the precautionary principle, because the precautionary principle
safeguards some of the most important gains of the environmental movement
in protecting human health and the environment from further injury by
anthropogenic sources. No brief form of words can definitively describe the
appropriate outcome of thousands of regulatory decisions in the widely
varying situations to which precaution applies, nor need it. A principle can
give general direction, it can set the tone, and most importantly it can provide
a fundamental commitment to act aggressively in regulatory domains where
scientific uncertainty is the norm.266 Arrayed against this commitment are a
host of economic interests whose claims to be free from stringent regulation
263 See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK
ASSESSMENT (1994). See also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK:
INFORM ING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1994).
2 Timothy Riley, Redressing the Silent Interim: Precautionary Action andShort Term Tests
in Toxicological Risk Assessment, 12 RISK 281 (2001).
265 See EUROPEAN ENVTL. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE REPORTNO. 22, LATE LESSONS
FROM EARLY WARNINGS: THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1896-2000 (2001).
266 Bodansky, a critic of the vagueness of the precautionary principle, nevertheless recognizes
its value in providing "a useful overall orientation." Daniel Bodansky, Comment, 34 ENV'T
3,5 (1992). See also Nollkaemper, supra note 17, at 79-81 (value of PP as a principle);
Konrad von Moltke, The Relationship Between Policy, Science, Technology, Economics and
Law in the Implementation of the Precautionary Principle, in THE CHALLENGE OF
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 4, at 101, 106; Christensen, Germany, in O'Riordan &
Cameron, supra note 12, at 53.
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are politically and economically powerful. To defend our core commitment
to protective standards, the environment needs a tiger, not a housecat.
